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1. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY  
This report explores the case for reforming alcohol duty in the United Kingdom, and the principles 
which should underpin a new, improved alcohol duty regime. This includes consideration of 
alcohol duty reforms that could be implemented following Brexit. 
The report notes a number of key issues with the current alcohol duty regime: 
• Significant disparities in duty charged for same strength products. While a relatively weak 
6% ABV bottle of wine faces duty of 50 pence per unit of alcohol, as of the time of writing 
a 6% ABV cider faces duty of just 7 pence per unit of alcohol. 
• Mixed incentives to produce weaker strength products. While beer duty increases or 
holds steady, on a per-unit of alcohol basis, with the strength of the product, this is not 
true for cider or wine. For these products, incentives to reduce product strength are 
limited.   
• An inconsistent approach to taxation. While beer and spirits duty are taxed according to 
pure alcohol content, wine and cider duty are taxed according to the volume of the final 
product. This is a reflection of EU regulatory requirements, which require wine and cider 
to be taxed in this way. Brexit could open up possibilities to rationalise alcohol taxation in 
the UK.  
• Lack of consideration for the alcohol tax system as a whole. Alcohol duty has become 
highly politicised and often driven by spurious arguments, rather than what evidence 
suggests would be most optimal – whether that be in terms of raising revenue, supporting 
jobs or improving public health outcomes.   
• Arguments often used to justify duty freezes and favourable treatment for certain 
beverages are deeply flawed. For example, jobs-based arguments used to justify cider 
and spirits duty freezes ignore the fact that cider accounts for a very small number of jobs 
in the economy, and the fact that about 90% of whisky is exported from the UK – meaning 
duty changes and domestic consumption patterns have little bearing on jobs.  Jobs-based 
arguments also ignore work lost through excessive alcohol consumption. Analysis by 
Public Health England found that, in 2015, there were 167,000 working years of life lost 
due to alcohol consumption – 16% of all working years lost in that year. 
Arguments used to call for a more favourable tax treatment for spirits tend to focus on the need 
to support the Scotch whisky industry, yet UK-produced whisky accounts for just 17% of spirits 
consumed in the UK. Whisky’s dominance in the political discourse around spirits, with its 
evocation of images of charming rural distilleries, thus seems highly misguided. Vodka is in fact 
the most widely consumed spirit in the UK, accounting for about 30% of total consumption. 
Arguments related to the regressive nature of excise duties are also flawed. Firstly, 
alcohol taxation does not appear to be particularly regressive, given relatively high rates 
of non-drinking among lower income households. Secondly, regressivity alone is not a 
strong argument against alcohol duty. Inequalities in the economy are better addressed 
through broader tax and welfare policy, rather than through alcohol duty which should 
largely be concerned with addressing the health and social harms caused by alcohol 
consumption.   
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The report notes the substantial health and social problems in the UK that are caused by 
excessive alcohol consumption: 
• Studies suggest that the total costs of alcohol to UK society could stand at between 
1.3% and 2.5% of GDP. This includes higher healthcare, policing and social care costs, 
as well as costs associated with lost productivity and lower employment.  
• While in the 1960s the UK had a much lower rate of liver disease and cirrhosis deaths 
than other European countries such as France, Spain and Italy – the UK now has a higher 
rate of deaths than these countries. 
• Alcohol-related deaths are more common in the most deprived areas of the United 
Kingdom. Alcohol-specific death rates among men in the most deprived quintile of the 
population are 4.3 times higher than for men in the least deprived quintile. For women, 
age-standardised death rates are 3.4 times higher. 
The report notes that, while the evidence around the health impacts of mild-to-moderate 
drinking is mixed, the adverse impacts of heavy drinking on individual health and society are 
indisputable. Hazardous and harmful drinkers account for a staggering 78% of alcohol consumed 
in England. This is despite the fact that these heavier drinkers account for just a quarter (25%) 
of the total population.  
There is also growing evidence suggesting that even moderate rates of alcohol consumption are 
associated with higher risks of cancer. 
We argue that alcohol duty should be reformed to focus taxation where health and other harms 
are greatest. This will ensure that lower risk drinkers are not overly penalised for their 
consumption of alcohol. It also increases the chance of duty reform reducing alcohol 
consumption among heavier drinkers, or at least ensuring that such drinkers are paying for the 
costs associated with their consumption.  
Analysis presented in this report provides insights into the types of drinker, and types of alcohol 
product, most associated with heavy drinking:  
• Heavy drinkers are more likely to consume higher strength products such as spirits and 
high strength beers and ciders. 
• Heavy drinkers are also more likely to consume alcohol in the off-trade (that is, drinking 
“at home” or “on the street”, rather than in a pub, bar or restaurant).  
• Heavy drinkers are more likely to consume cheaper alcoholic beverages.  
To better focus alcohol taxation on where health and other social harms are greatest, this report 
sets out five recommendations for a revised alcohol duty system: 
1. Introducing a duty strength escalator, to focus alcohol duty on the higher strength 
products disproportionately consumed by heavy drinkers, and create stronger incentives 
to produce lower strength products.  
There is at least tentative evidence that alcohol producers respond to duty changes, by 
reformulating products. Carlsberg reduced the strength of its low strength lager, Skol, 
from 3% to 2.8% ABV, in response to the introduction of a new lower-rate duty band for 
low strength beers. AB InBev has also reduced the strength of more mainstream brands 
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of beer – including Stella Artois, Budweiser and Becks – as a means of reducing costs 
associated with alcohol duty. 
2. Levelling the playing field across same-strength products. Products of the same strength 
should face the same rate of duty and duty should be a function of the pure alcohol content 
of drinks, rather than the volume of the final product. This would help simplify the alcohol 
duty system.  
 
3. Allowing pubs to claim back a proportion of alcohol duty through a new “Pub Relief”. This 
would focus alcohol duty on the off-trade, which is particularly reliant on sales to 
hazardous and harmful drinkers.  
 
Conceivably, this could work in a similar way to Alcoholic Ingredients Relief, which already 
exists. With Alcohol Ingredients Relief, businesses can claim relief on alcohol excise duty 
when they use alcohol as an ingredient in drinks less than 1.2% ABV, chocolates, vinegar 
and other foods for human consumption (below a certain alcohol content). 
 
4. Explicitly linking alcohol duty to the social costs of alcohol, rather than treating it as a 
cash cow. At the very least, alcohol duty should cover the health, crime and welfare costs 
to government and wider society (the “externalities” associated with alcohol 
consumption).Paternalistic arguments, which consider the ability of individuals to make 
“bad” and regrettable lifestyle choices (such as those that undermine their job 
prospects),  could justify a higher tax take. 
Alcohol duty should not be treated as a cash cow for government. The UK public finances 
are already overly reliant on niche taxes, rather than broad taxes such as income tax and 
VAT. Reliance on niche taxes makes the public finances inherently more volatile and at 
risk from factors such as changing consumer preferences. Linking alcohol duty to social 
harms, rather than as a general tool for revenue raising, could help to improve dialogue 
between drinks manufacturers, government and health experts. 
 
5. Regularising the uprating of alcohol duty, with inflation or earnings uprating being the 
“norm”. This would help depoliticise the setting of alcohol duty.  
 
While we believe inflation or earnings should be the “status quo” form of uprating duty,  
this should be complemented with review periods, held perhaps on a five or 10 yearly 
basis. The purpose of the review period would be to explore the latest evidence base on 
alcohol-related costs to society, and ensure that alcohol duty tax take is broadly in line 
with these costs – as we proposed in Recommendation 4 above. This review should be 
informed by expert insights from government, the healthcare sector, academics, charities 
and industry, taking into account the latest evidence and structural trends. As we 
discussed in this report, some of the evidence base, for example on the health impacts of 
mild-to-moderate drinking, remain debatable; conceivably estimates of the social cost of 
alcohol could change significantly as our knowledge-base improves.  
The review period would provide further incentives for drinks manufacturers to reduce 
alcohol-related harms - for example by withdrawing “worst offender” products from the 
market (such as high strength, low quality, low cost drinks) and advertising the risks of 
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excessive consumption of alcoholic products. Manufacturers would be incentivised to do 
this in order to reduce structural duty increases following the review period. 
Some of the recommendations we outline above can only be realised in the event of European-
wide regulatory reform, or the UK pursuing a different approach to regulation following Brexit. As 
discussed earlier, European directives bind the UK to taxing wine and cider according to the 
volume rather than the alcohol content of the final product. In addition to the possibility that the 
UK remains in the EU, or returns to the EU following departure, the UK might still be bound by EU 
regulations following a permanent Brexit. This might be a requirement for a successful trade deal 
with the EU following Brexit, for example.  
Even if European regulations constrain the possibility for duty reform, there is still scope to have 
a more optimal regime than we have at present – one that better focuses taxation where harms 
are being most generated. This includes: 
1. Regular uprating and evidence-based duty reviews. 
2. Introducing more duty bands for cider (as Ireland has done) to better incentivise the 
production of lower strength products. 
3. Bringing beer, cider, spirits and wine duty more closely into line in the sub-8.5% ABV 
category, for similar strength products. 
4. Introducing a new duty band for beer, between 2.8% and 3.9% ABV. It was brought up in 
our discussions with industry that there is likely to be a broader market for beverages in 
this kind of strength category, as opposed to the sub 2.8% ABV category which is 
relatively niche. However, the current duty system does not incentivise production of 
such beverages. Alternatively, there may be a case for increasing the upper limit of the “< 
2.8%” beer duty band, to cover low strength beers which are more likely to gain 
mainstream demand.  
5. Narrowing the main duty band for wine. In the UK the main duty rate for still wine runs from 
5.5% ABV to 15% ABV. EU law requires that there has to be a single band for wine between 
8.5% and 15% ABV. As the UK’s main still wine and made-wine band is currently 5.5% to 
15% ABV, it would be possible to split the main still wine and made-wine band into two, 
and introduce stronger incentives via duty to produce low strength wines between 5.5% 
ABV and 8.5% ABV.  
  




Alcohol duty is one of the most dysfunctional parts of the UK tax system.  Duty varies dramatically 
across beverages, products are taxed on different bases and incentives to produce lower 
strength products are mixed. Indeed, for some drinks categories, the duty system acts to 
encourage the production of higher strength products – even though evidence suggests that the 
heaviest drinkers tend to consume stronger products. 
Critically, alcohol taxation has been shaped heavily by politics, rather than economics, data and 
analysis.  For example, alcohol duty freezes and cuts in recent years have often been motivated 
by a desire among politicians to protect jobs tied to the production of alcoholic beverages. Yet, 
as we discuss in this report, the link between alcohol duty and jobs in these industries is often 
much weaker than the political discourse seems to assume. Further, the political discourse 
largely ignores the job and productivity losses caused by excessive alcohol consumption.   
Given the political nature of duty changes, the UK has been lumbered with a system of alcohol 
taxation ill-suited for meeting key objectives of government: raising tax revenue, protecting jobs 
or improving public health and other social outcomes. Rather than examining the evidence base 
and reflecting on the alcohol duty regime as a whole, the system has been tweaked according to 
political whims over time.  
This needs to change – not least for public health reasons. Although per capita alcohol 
consumption in the UK peaked in 2004 and has declined since then, liver cirrhosis death rates in 
the UK remain higher than in the 1970s.  As we discuss in this report, alcohol contributes to 
substantial and widening health inequalities which exist in the UK. Excessive alcohol 
consumption among some segments of the population is also contributing to the UK’s relatively 
poor performance on public health outcomes compared with our European neighbours. For 
example, while rates of liver disease and cirrhosis deaths have declined dramatically in France, 
Italy and Spain since the 1970s, they have increased in the UK – leaving Britain with the highest 
rate of liver disease and cirrhosis deaths among these countries.  
The focus on this report is on setting out the principles which should underpin a reformed, and 
improved, system of alcohol duty in the UK – one that can deliver better health, social and 
economic outcomes than the current regime. We believe that the reforms proposed in this report 
would ensure that alcohol duty is more focused on products associated with the greatest health 
and social problems – and less focused on lower risk drinkers consuming low-to-moderate 
amounts of alcohol. 
In addition to ensuring the alcohol duty is better targeted, we also consider the role that duty can 
play in creating stronger incentives for alcoholic drinks manufacturers to produce less harmful 
beverages – through for example reducing product strength or removing “problem” brands (such 
as white cider and other low cost, low quality, high strength products).  
We emphasise that the report is principally concerned with the system of alcohol duty rather than 
the overall level of alcohol taxation. This reflects the fact that the overall level of taxation from 
alcohol depends strongly on the preferences of politicians and the electorate. Attitudes towards 
what is widely referred to as “paternalism” vary markedly – with implications for views on the 
extent to which policymakers should seek to steer the public’s decision-making through tools 
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such as taxation. We take no views on the extent to which policymakers should be paternalistic 
in this report – merely noting that opinions are divided on the issue.  
One rationale for publishing this report now is Brexit. Depending on the nature of the UK’s 
departure from the European Union (if, indeed, the UK departs), there may be scope to reform 
significantly the way alcoholic beverages are taxed in the UK. At present, some of the 
irregularities in the alcohol duty system are a reflection of EU-wide regulation – in particular 
Directive 92/83/EEC which sets out the basis on which excise duty is calculated1. Following 
Brexit, policymakers will probably be keen to explore the regulatory and tax reforms that have 
been “unlocked” by leaving the European Union - and alcohol duty might be an area where 
positive changes could be realised. 
The structure of this report is as follows: 
• Chapter 3 elaborates on the case for reforming alcohol duty in the UK, highlighting the 
recent history of duty changes and the inconsistencies within the current duty system. 
• Chapter 4 compares the UK alcohol duty regime with other countries. 
• Chapter 5 examines the profile of UK drinkers – how much they consume, their 
demographic characteristics and where the burden of alcohol duty falls across the 
population. It also considers the evidence base around the link between alcohol 
taxation, alcohol prices and levels of consumption among different types of drinker 
• Chapter 6 explores the linkages between alcohol duty, alcohol consumption, health and 
other social outcomes. 
• Chapter 7 explores the linkages between alcohol duty, alcohol consumption and jobs. 
• Chapter 8 sets out a series of principles which should underpin a reformed alcohol duty 
system, informed by the preceding analysis. 
• Chapter 9 provides a high-level assessment of what the impact of shifting to a revised 
alcohol duty system would be – on prices and levels of alcohol consumption.  
• Chapter 10 draws conclusions from the preceding analysis. 
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3. THE CASE FOR REFORMING ALCOHOL DUTY 
This chapter provides a brief overview of the alcohol duty system in the UK, highlighting the 
apparent inconsistencies within the current regime. It thus provides a motivation for the rest of 
the report.  
How are alcoholic beverages taxed? 
In addition to VAT, alcoholic beverages are subject to excise duties. As with other excise taxes, 
such as fuel and tobacco duty, alcohol duty falls due at the time when the goods leave any duty 
suspension arrangements. This includes when they are released for consumption from 
warehouses or if goods imported for personal use are then sold or put to commercial use2.  
As with VAT, excise duty is technically paid for by business, though ultimately the consumer bears 
most of the cost of the tax as this is passed on in the form of higher prices. The extent to which 
the burden of a business tax is ultimately borne by the end consumer is commonly referred to as 
the “passthrough rate”. 
A frequent point made in the discourse around alcohol duty, and indeed other excise duties, is 
the existence of “double taxation”. VAT is applied after duty, so the impact of duty rates on 
consumer prices is in fact 1.2 times the stated rate of duty (assuming passthrough rates are close 
to 100%). 
Through passthrough to consumers, alcohol duty thus has an impact on prices faced by 
individuals. We emphasise that alcohol duty differs from minimum unit pricing (MUP) – another 
potential policy lever for influencing alcohol prices – in several important ways. Firstly, alcohol 
duty is a form of taxation, yielding direct revenue for government. In contrast, MUP sets a 
minimum price that a unit of alcohol (defined as 10ml of pure alcohol) can be sold at; it is not 
therefore a form of taxation and affects government revenues more indirectly – through for 
example changes in VAT receipts reflecting price increases and changes in levels of 
consumption. Further, alcohol duty impacts the end price of all beverages, whereas MUP impacts 
the price of relatively low-cost alcoholic beverages (at least directly – conceivably producers 
might alter the prices of relatively more expensive drinks in response to MUP).  
A MUP of 50p per unit of alcohol was implemented in Scotland in 2018 and the Welsh Government 
is “committed” to introducing a minimum price for alcohol3.  The UK Government does not, 
currently, have plans to introduce MUP in England.   
Another policy tool that has been implemented to influence alcohol prices, beyond MUP and duty, 
is bans on below-cost sales of alcohol. Since May 2014, shops and bars in England & Wales have 
been unable to sell drinks for less than the tax (duty plus VAT) paid on them. However, in contrast 
to MUP and alcohol duty, such a measure impacts a very small proportion of alcohol sold in the 
UK; the Institute of Fiscal Studies found that only 0.9% of products in the off-trade would be 
affected by the policy4. 
In summary, alcohol duty in the UK sits alongside other policy levers which aim to increase the 
price of alcohol above where it would stand in an unregulated, free market. As we discuss later, 
a key rationale for increasing the price of alcohol above market rates is to ensure the price 
reflects the social harms associated with alcohol consumption.   
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How much revenue does alcohol duty raise?  
In the fiscal year 2018/19, alcohol duty raised £12bn for the government – 1.5% of total current 
revenues in that year. Including VAT applied to alcohol duty, revenue raised increases to £14bn. 
Split by product category, wine accounted for 36% of duty receipts in 2018/19, spirits accounted 
for 31%, beer accounted for 30% and cider accounted for 2%. As Figure 1 below shows, while 
alcohol duty receipts have increased since the year 2000, they have declined as a share of total 
government current income – from 1.8% in 1999/00 to 1.5% in 2018/19. 
Figure 1 Alcohol duty receipts, £ billion and as a share of total government current receipts 
 
Source: HMRC alcohol duty bulletin, ONS public finances statistics 
 
How are alcohol duty rates determined? 
Alcohol duty rates are set by the Chancellor of the Exchequer and as such are determined by the 
preferences of the prevailing government. Duty is, therefore, a highly politicised policy 
instrument. 
Over the years, alcohol duty changes have been motivated on several grounds. This includes: 
• The need to raise revenue for the Exchequer – and help address fiscal deficits. 
• The need to curb “problem” drinking – using alcohol duty to increase the consumer price 
of beverages, and curb excessive drinking. As well as the uprating of duty rates over time, 
we have also seen the introduction of new tax bands aimed at targeting products 
perceived to be particularly harmful, as well as promoting products perceived to be 
“healthier”. Examples of this include the introduction of higher duty bands for high 
strength cider, and a lower duty band for low strength beer.  
• The need to preserve jobs in the economy – justifying freezes and cuts to duty, and 
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industries such as beer, cider and whisky production. With respect to cider and whisky 
production, the concentration of employment in these industries in particular parts of the 
UK is a key part of the policy debate – with some arguing that excessive rates of duty risk 
having a significant adverse economic impact on particular regions of the country. 
Although the government has a great deal of control over the prevailing rates of taxation and their 
uprating over time, the hands of UK policymakers are somewhat tied by EU regulation – as we 
noted in the preceding chapter.   
EU Directive 92/83/EEC sets out a range of requirements around alcohol duty, effectively 
harmonising structures across the EU. While beer and spirits duty rates can be applied to the 
pure alcohol content of each beverage, wine and cider duty rates must be applied to the total 
volume of the beverage – meaning duty rates cannot vary by product strength within the bands 
in which products are defined. 
 
What are the current duty rates and how has this changed over time? 
Reflecting the domestic political motivations and EU regulations described, the UK has ended up 
with an alcohol duty system where rates of duty differ markedly across different categories of 
alcoholic beverage.  
This is most apparent when examining the amount of duty charged per unit of alcohol across 
beverages. The reason for looking at duty per unit of alcohol, is that it is the alcohol content of 
beverages which generates health and other social harms – as such this should be the prime 
target of the tax at least from the perspective of using duty as a tool to address the harms caused 
by the consumption of alcoholic beverages.  
As Figure 2 shows, duty per unit of alcohol varies substantially across products, and across 
different strength drinks. While a relatively weak 6% ABV bottle of wine faces duty of 50 pence 
per unit of alcohol, as of the time of writing a 6% ABV cider faces duty of just 7 pence per unit of 
alcohol. While beer duty increases or holds steady, on a per-unit of alcohol basis, with the 
strength of the product, this is not true for cider (except for the strongest varieties). Wine duty 
is even less coherent, as the graph shows, reflecting the requirement that, within specific bands, 
wine duty must be applied to the volume of the final product rather than the pure alcohol content. 
  
POUR DECISIONS? THE CASE FOR REFORMING ALCOHOL DUTY 
14 
 
Figure 2 Alcohol duty per unit of alcohol, by product type 
 
 
Source: SMF calculations based on HMRC alcohol duty statistics 
In the UK, alcohol duty has been uprated on an inconsistent basis over time. Rather than being 
uprated regularly by inflation or some other statistic such as employee earnings, political 
intervention has resulted in a situation where duty has grown at different rates for different 
products. In part, this reflects changing policy objectives. For example, the prolonged period of 
spirits duty freezes in the 1990s and early 2000s was in part motivated by a desire among 
policymakers at the time to support the Scotch whisky industry to lobby other countries to reduce 
spirits taxation (by requesting that they follow the UK in reducing or freezing duty)5. Generally, 
since then, the policy regime has shifted away from one that would gradually remove the duty 
gap between spirits and other beverages, given that it would leave spirits cheaper, per unit of 
alcohol, than beer or cider (reflecting the lower average production costs of spirits6).  
Figure 3 below shows alcohol duty rates, per unit of alcohol, for typical strength products over 
time, adjusted for inflation. Compared with 1995, spirits duty is lower in real terms – meaning that 
it has become cheaper relative to the price of other goods and services. Cider duty increased in 
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Figure 3 Duty per unit of alcohol, over time, January 1995 = 100. Expressed in June 2019 prices, deflated 
using the Consumer Price Index 
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Figure 4 % change in real alcohol duty rates, January 1995 – June 2019 
 
 
Source: SMF calculations based on HMRC alcohol duty statistics. Consumer Price Index used as price deflator for creating 
a real time series 
 
The problems with the current duty system 
The analysis above has shown that alcohol duty is, at first glance, highly irregular – given the 
variations in rates across products, and inconsistencies in how these have been uprated over 
time. But why does this matter? 
The simple answer is that the alcohol duty system, as it stands, is likely to be a highly inefficient 
way of meeting the goals of government – protecting jobs, raising revenue and improving health 
outcomes. From an optimal tax perspective, duty rates should be concentrated where 
externalities are generated – such as health and other social harms. By “externalities”, we mean 
costs to society which are not reflected in the pre-tax price of a good. Examples of externalities, 
in this sense, are pollution and congestion. In the case of alcohol, externalities include costs to 
the police and National Health Service, as well as damage inflicted on other individuals through 
violence, crime and family breakdown. 
Focusing duty on where externalities are being generated ensures that mild-to-moderate 
drinkers are less likely to be impacted adversely by duty, while heavy drinkers are more likely to 
face higher rates of duty – leading to either lower rates of consumption, or at least ensuring that 
they are “paying” for the costs their actions are placing on wider society. In economic terms, 
ensuring that lower risk drinkers are not excessively penalised is good for social welfare.  
As the following chapters of this report show, arguments in defence of the current duty system 
– such as the need to protect jobs – often do not stand up to scrutiny. Critically, policymakers 
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regime as a whole and structuring it in a way that best meets the objectives of government, duty 
for specific products has been tweaked over time, without consideration for impact on the range 
of objectives of government.  
Given the lack of joined up thinking on alcohol duty, there is likely to be significant scope to do 
better than the current regime. This report explores the evidence around alcohol consumption, 
jobs, health, the economy and tax revenues – using this to inform some principles for an alcohol 
duty regime better placed to meet the objectives of government. 
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4. HOW DOES ALCOHOL TAXATION IN THE UK COMPARE WITH OTHER COUNTRIES?   
The previous chapter showed that the UK’s alcohol duty system contains numerous irregularities. 
But is the UK an anomaly in having a dysfunctional duty regime? This is the question to which we 
now turn.  
 
Alcohol taxation in Europe 
Approaches to alcohol taxation across much of Europe suffer similar issues to the UK, with a 
general lack of a “systems approach” which optimises duty rates to best address government 
objectives. Similar to Figure 2 in this report, “spaghetti charts” of alcohol duty per unit of alcohol 
can be seen in other European countries, such as Denmark, Finland and Ireland. In part this 
reflects these countries facing the same regulatory constraints as the UK, with European 
directives binding them to taxing wine by volume of final product rather than alcohol content. 
This is charted overleaf. 
Numerous countries avoid having a “spaghetti chart” by zero-rating wine duty. Wine is zero-
rated in multiple European countries, including major wine producers such as France, Italy and 
Spain. No country treats “alcohol as alcohol”, with either a fixed duty rate per unit of alcohol, or 
a rate that is at least fixed for products of the same strength in terms of alcohol content. In part 
this reflects European directives which influence how different products can be taxed. But it also 
reflects the fact that there are compelling justifications for taxing spirits at a higher rate to other 
alcoholic beverages – for example, due to the lower average production costs for spirits, which 
make their pre-tax prices, per unit of alcohol, lower than for drinks such as beer and cider.  
As with the UK, jobs-related arguments provide a political rationale for favourable tax treatment 
of some products. As Angus, Holmes and Meier noted in their recent review of alcohol duty 
systems across Europe7: 
“There is only limited evidence that alcohol duties are designed to minimize public health harms by 
ensuring that drinks containing more alcohol are taxed at higher rates. Instead, tax rates appear to 
reflect national alcohol production and consumption patterns.” 
That is to say, alcohol duty appears to be a highly politicised, rather than evidence-informed, 
form of taxation across Europe.  
Having said that, there are lessons that the UK could possibly learn from other European 
countries. We note, for example, that other countries have fewer perverse incentives embedded 
in their alcohol duty systems than the UK. Ireland, for example, has introduced more cider duty 
strength bands than the UK; creating a situation where duty per unit of alcohol is not too dissimilar 
to beer, and less inclined to fall as product strength increases (a key issue with cider duty in the 
UK). 
 




Alcohol taxation in the United States 
In the United States, there are federal and state excise taxes on alcohol – allowing some degree 
of regional variation within the country.  
Federal tax rates for wine and beer are calculated according to the final volume of the product, 
meaning duty per unit of alcohol falls with product strength within given tax bands.   
At a state level, alcohol taxes vary significantly, both in terms of structure and overall level of 
taxation. For example, while state beer excise duty in Wyoming was just $0.02 per gallon in 
January 2019, this was $1.29 per gallon in Tennessee. Some states, including Florida, Texas and 
Hawaii, have additional complexities in their approach to beer taxation. This includes varying 
taxation according to alcohol content, place of production, size of container, or place purchased 
(on or off-trade). Several states, such as Arkansas have a specific sales tax for alcoholic 
beverages in addition to excise duty – meaning that alcohol is taxed on an ad valorem basis 
according to price, as well as a $ per gallon basis8.  
 
Alcohol taxation in Australia – favouring on-trade consumption 
Australia provides an interesting point of comparison to the UK, in terms of alcohol taxation. While 
it shares several of the inconsistencies seen in the UK duty system, such as substantial 
differences in duty rates across products of similar strength, it differs in two notable ways. Firstly, 
beer duty in Australia explicitly favours on-trade alcohol consumption (that is, alcohol consumed 
in licensed premises such as pubs, bars and restaurants) – with a lower rate of duty for draught 
rather than packaged beer. Secondly, wine duty in Australia is an ad-valorem tax – varying 
according to the price of the bottle of wine on sale. This means that, for wine, duty per unit of 
alcohol increases with product price. 
Figure 6 Effective excise taxes in Australia (2015) 
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Alcohol taxation in Singapore – attempts to “rationalise” the duty regime 
The one country we identified with a significantly “rationalised” alcohol duty system is Singapore. 
In the Singapore Budget 2007, the government announced that: 
“We will progressively move towards taxing liquors on the basis of alcoholic content. From 1st 
January 2008, [we] will tax beer and stout on this new basis. This is a rationalisation of duties 
and is not aimed at generating additional revenues”.  
Since 2008, Singapore has retained a simple excise duty system, with just two rates – an excise 
duty rate for beer, cider & perry and an excise duty rate for wines and spirits. Both of these rates 
are calculated according to the pure alcohol content of the beverage – in contrast to the duty 
regime prior to 2008 which taxed according to volume of the final product. The duty rate for beer 
and cider is lower than the duty rate for wine and spirits, meaning duty per unit of alcohol is higher 
for stronger (on average, in terms of alcohol content) products9.  
 
Summary 
Across most of the countries we have examined, alcohol taxation has significant inconsistencies 
and appears to be largely a reflection of politics rather than attempts to provide an optimal form 
of taxation from an economic, social and public health perspective. 
Having said that, there may be lessons that the UK could learn from other countries. This includes 
the Republic of Ireland’s attempts to rationalise duty within the constraints of EU regulation, with 
more duty bands for cider. Singapore’s approach to alcohol taxation shows the potential to 
simplify duty regimes significantly. And the distinction between on-trade and off-trade alcohol 
taxation in Australia and some US states provides examples of how alcohol duty could be more 
targeted on specific types of consumption. As we discuss in the following chapter, certain types 
of drinker are more likely to drink in the off-trade than the on-trade. 
One challenge with cross-country comparisons of alcohol taxation is understanding the impact 
of the alcohol duty regime on drinking patterns and the extent to which drinking patterns in one 
country would mimic those in another if they were to adopt similar tax regimes. Variations in 
“drinking culture” and other health outcomes create difficulties in drawing cross-country 
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5. WHO DRINKS IN THE UK AND HOW MUCH ARE WE DRINKING? 
The preceding chapters explored the structure of the duty regime in the UK, and how it compares 
with other countries. We argued that the current alcohol duty regime is ill-equipped to meet the 
goals of policymakers and there is scope to improve upon the current system from a social 
welfare perspective. 
To understand how the alcohol duty regime should be improved, it is crucial to have a firm 
understanding of drinking patterns in the UK – who is drinking, how much they are drinking, as 
well as what and where they are drinking. Understanding who the heaviest drinkers in society 
are, and what they are drinking, can inform us as to where alcohol taxation should be targeted – 
whether that be to incentivise people to drink less, or to ensure that heavy drinkers are “paying” 
for the health and other social costs of their actions.   
As we show in this chapter, drinking patterns in the UK vary markedly across different segments 
of the population, with rates of non-drinking and heavy drinking varying across income groups, 
age groups and regions of the country. Further, as we show in this chapter, heavy drinkers 
account for a substantial proportion of all alcohol consumed in the UK.  
 
Headline drinking trends 
In 2018, per capita pure alcohol consumption in the United Kingdom stood at 9.8 litres, among 
those aged 15 and over. While this is 15% below the peak of 11.6 litres seen in 2004, per capita 
consumption remains 30% higher than in the early 1960s. Further, the trajectory since 2015 has 
been one of rising alcohol consumption following a period of decline – as the figure below shows. 
The most notable periods of growth in per capita alcohol consumption are from the mid-1960s to 
the end of the 1970s, and another period of growth in the late 1990s and early 2000s. 
Figure 7 Per capita pure alcohol consumption among population aged 15 and over, litres, 1961-2018 
 
Source: World Health Organisation Global Health Observatory data repository (1961-2009). SMF calculations based on 
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What are people drinking? 
The ”drinking profile” of the UK, in terms of products consumed, has changed significantly since 
the 1960s. While in the early 1960s about 80% of alcohol was consumed through beer or cider, 
by 2018 these beverages accounted for just 43% of alcohol consumption. Wine has risen from 
just 4% of UK alcohol consumption in 1961 to about a third (33%) of consumption in 2018. Spirits 
now account for about a quarter of alcohol consumed in the UK (24% in 2018), up from 15% in 
1961. This is shown in the graph below. 
Figure 8 Pure alcohol consumption, by beverage category, 1961-2018 
 
 
Source: World Health Organisation Global Health Observatory data repository (1961-2009). SMF calculations based on 
HMRC alcohol clearance statistics and ONS population estimates for 2010-2018. 
One implication of the shift away from beer and cider consumption, and towards spirits and wine 
consumption, is that the British are, on average, drinking much stronger alcoholic beverages 
than in the past. Our estimates of average product strength, graphed below, suggest a 58% 
increase in average strength of alcoholic product consumed between 1961 and 2018, from 10.0% 
to 15.8% ABV. This is based on the strength of the alcoholic beverage itself; some drinks, in 
particular spirits, will be mixed with other products such as juice, soda and tonic water prior to 
consumption. We do not have enough data to account for such mixing in our calculation of 
average strength, though it is unlikely to change the key conclusion that average product 
strength has increased significantly in recent years1.     
                                                     
1 The conclusion would only change if spirits are considerably more diluted (mixed with other drinkers) now 
than had been the case in the past. We also note the difficult of measuring the extent to which spirits are 
diluted, particularly when consumed on the off-trade, given the tendency of individuals to “overpour” 











































































Beer/Cider  Wine Spirits
POUR DECISIONS? THE CASE FOR REFORMING ALCOHOL DUTY 
24 
 
We assume that the strength of products has held steady over this time period, due to data 
limitations. There is some evidence that the average strength of wine has increased over time, 
reflecting increased consumption of wines from parts of the world which tend to produce higher 
strength varieties10. 
As we discuss in the chapter on alcohol consumption and health outcomes, the strength of 
product consumed potentially has a bearing on the scale of alcohol-related harms. Further, as 
we discuss in this chapter, higher strength products are more likely to be favoured by the 
heaviest drinkers in the country. 
Figure 9 Estimated average ABV of alcoholic beverages consumed in the UK, % 
 
 
Source: World Health Organisation Global Health Observatory data repository (1961-2009). SMF calculations based on 
HMRC alcohol clearance statistics and ONS population estimates for 2010-2018. Average ABV of 4.5% assumed for 
beer/cider, 12.6% for wine and 40% for spirits 
 
Where do people drink? 
One of the most notable trends in alcohol consumption in recent decades has been the shift from 
on-trade consumption to off-trade consumption. While in the early 1990s most alcohol was 
consumed in pubs, bars and restaurants, by the turn of the new millennium most alcohol was 
being consumed in the off-trade. Beer and cider went from being drinks mainly consumed in the 
on-trade, to drinks mainly consumed in the off-trade (such as at home or on the street). 
Having said that, we note that off-trade and on-trade consumption are not mutually exclusive 
experiences; there has been a significant amount of discussion in the media and political 
discourse on “pre-loading” – individuals consuming alcohol at home before consuming more at 
a bar and pub later in the day. A motivation for this is likely to be financial reasons.  Pre-loading 
has been discussed, in particular, in relation to binge drinking culture and a potential contributor 
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showed 62% of local authority respondents to a survey highlighting pre-loading as something 
that occurs in their area to a great or moderate extent. Two in five (39%) felt there was a 
correlation between the pre-loading of alcohol and alcohol-related crime and disorder11. 
The shift from on-trade on off-trade consumption has a range of implications as far as alcohol 
duty policy is concerned. Firstly, it has a bearing on some of the jobs-related arguments used to 
justify alcohol duty changes – given that alcohol consumption is decreasingly tied to jobs in pubs, 
bars and restaurants. Secondly, where people drink has implications on the types of social and 
health externalities generated by alcohol consumption – for example binge drinking, street 
violence and domestic violence.  
Figure 10 % of units of alcohol consumed through the off-trade, England and Wales 
 
 
Source: MESAS monitoring report 2019. Note that years covered are discontinuous in the 1990s, with data only for 1994 
and 1995 
 
How does alcohol consumption vary across the population?  
Levels of alcohol consumption vary significantly across demographic groups. Here we highlight 
some of the most notable trends. 
Alcohol consumption across the income distribution 
There is a link between alcohol consumption and income. Those in the highest income groups in 
the UK tend to drink more alcohol, on average, than those in the lower income groups. They are 
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personal gross income of less than £10,000 were non-drinkers in 2017, this falls to just 6% 
among those with a personal income of £40,000 or more.  
Those on higher incomes drink more frequently than those on lower incomes. According to 
Opinions and Lifestyle Survey data from 2017, some 7% of those earning less than £10,000 per 
year drank on at least five days in the week before they were surveyed. This proportion doubles 
to 14% when considering those earning £40,000 or more.  
Further, those on higher incomes are more likely to binge drink on their heaviest drinking day – 
defined here as a man exceeding 8 units of alcohol and a woman exceeding 6 units of alcohol. 
Over a fifth (22%) of those earning £40,000 or more binge drank on their heaviest drinking day, 
twice as high at the 11% seen for those earning less than £10,000 per year. The varying 
prevalence in binge drinking rates largely reflects the greater proportion of non-drinkers in the 
lower income groups – when just considering drinkers, binge drinking rates peak among those 
earning between £15,000 and £20,000.   
 
Figure 11 Drinking patterns, by gross annual personal income, proportion of population, 2017, % 
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Figure 12 Amount of alcohol consumed on heaviest drinking day, by gross annual personal income, 2017, 
proportion of population, %  
 
 
Source: ONS Opinions and Lifestyle Survey 
In terms of the type of product consumed, SMF analysis of the Defra Family Food dataset 
suggests that spirits represent a greater proportion of alcohol purchases (combined on and off-
trade purchases) among those in the lowest income quintile. Fortified wine and cider purchases 
also account for a greater proportion of alcohol consumed by those on lower incomes.  Beer and 
lager consumption accounts for a similar proportion of alcohol consumption across income 
quintiles, while non-fortified wine consumption increases as a proportion of alcohol purchases 
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Figure 13 Distribution of pure alcohol consumption by household income quintile, 2015-2016/17 
 
 
Source: SMF analysis of Defra Family Food dataset 
 
Alcohol consumption by region 
There is significant regional variation in levels of alcohol consumption and drinking patterns.  
Binge drinking rates are particularly high in Scotland. According to the 2017 Opinions and 
Lifestyle Survey, 37% of Scottish people aged over 16 or over binge drank in the last week, 
excluding the 21% of Scots that do not drink at all. Concerningly, about a quarter (24%) drank 
even more heavily than the standard binge drinking threshold – consuming more than 12 units 
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Figure 14 Amount of alcohol consumed on heaviest drinking day, by region, proportion of population, %, 
2017 
 
Source: ONS Opinions and Lifestyle Survey 
While beer consumption accounts for a relatively high proportion of alcohol consumed in the 
North East of England, spirits consumption accounts for a relatively high proportion of drinks 
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Figure 15 Distribution of pure alcohol consumption by region, 2015-2016/17 
 
 
Source: SMF analysis of Defra Family Food dataset 
 
Alcohol consumption by type of drinker 
Stating the obvious, levels of alcohol consumption differ across mild, moderate and heavy 
drinkers. But the extent to which this is the case is, perhaps, underappreciated: analysis by 
Bhattacharya, Angus et al found that hazardous and harmful drinkers account for a staggering 
78% of alcohol consumed in England2. This is even though these heavier drinkers account for 
just a quarter (25%) of the total population12.  
Notably, recent research by the Institute for Fiscal Studies has found the heavier drinkers tend 
to consume alcohol products that are both cheaper and stronger on average, compared with 
lighter drinkers13. The higher average strength of products consumed reflects differences in type 
of beverage consumed, with the heaviest drinkers more likely to consume a higher proportion of 
spirits. It also reflects choice of products within beverage categories – with heavier drinkers 
more likely to consume higher strength beers and ciders, for example. 
  
                                                     
2 Hazardous drinking defined as 15-35 units of alcohol per week for women, or 15-50 units per week for 
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Figure 16 Average alcoholic strength and price of products purchased, across the distribution of drinkers 
 
 
Source: IFS (2017), “Tax Design in the Alcohol Market” 
Analysis also suggests that heavy drinking is more concentrated in the off-trade rather than the 
on-trade. The study by Bhattacharya, Angus et al found that harmful drinkers - the most 
detrimental level of drinker after “hazardous drinkers”3 - account for 32% of alcohol-related 
revenue in the off-trade, compared with 17% of revenue in the on-trade. Across all beverage 
categories, but especially for wine, cider and spirits, harmful and hazardous alcohol consumption 
is more heavily concentrated in the off-trade. 
                                                     
3 “Hazardous drinking” is defined as 15-35 units of alcohol per week for women, or 15-50 unit of alcohol 
per week for men. “Harmful drinking” defined as 36+ units per week for women or 51+ units per week for 
men.  
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Source: Bhattacharya, Angus et al (2018), “How dependent is the alcohol industry on heavy drinking in England?” 
 
How much do Brits spend on drink and how much does alcohol duty affect prices? 
Prices of alcohol vary significantly across product categories and whether consumption is taking 
place in the on-trade versus the off-trade.  
Prices tend to be much higher in the on-trade than the off-trade, though the extent to which this 
is the case varies across products, as Figure 18 shows. The “on-trade average price premium” is 
particularly high for spirits and fortified wine, per unit of alcohol. This suggests that spirits and 
fortified wine consumption in bars, pubs and restaurants is likely to be very different to spirits 
and fortified wine consumption taking place at home.  
A plausible hypothesis here is that on-trade spirits consumption tends to be much more focused 
on premium products, while off-trade consumption tends to be more focused on lower price, 
lower quality products. This would also explain the data of Bhattacharya, Angus et al – which 
showed off-trade spirits consumption being markedly more dependent on heavy drinkers than 
on-trade spirits consumption; they appear to be very different markets catering to very different 
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Figure 18 Average price per unit of alcohol in England and Wales, 2018 
 
 
Source: MESAS monitoring report 2019. 
For some products, alcohol duty makes up a significant component of the end-price of alcohol.  
In the off-trade, duty accounts for a higher proportion of the consumer price of spirits than for 
other beverages, at about 60%. One often-cited rationale for taxing spirits at a higher rate than 
other beverages, mentioned earlier, is that production costs tend to be lower than for beer and 
cider. In the absence of higher alcohol duty, sprits would be significantly cheaper than beer or 
cider, per unit of alcohol, in the off-trade.  
In the on-trade, we estimate that spirits duty accounts for a lower proportion of the average sale 
price than is the case for wine and beer – again reflecting the substantially different nature of 
on-trade versus off-trade spirits consumption – with on-trade consumption tending to be more 
premium products where production costs are likely to be higher. In addition, “brand price 
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Figure 19 Average price per unit of alcohol in England and Wales, 2018. “Duty” figures include VAT on duty 
 
 
Source: SMF analysis of MESAS monitoring report 2019. 
Compared with the price of other goods in the economy (as measured by headline inflation 
indices), alcohol has become relatively more affordable over time, as the chart below shows. 
Furthermore, compared with household incomes, alcohol has become relatively more affordable. 
This reflects a combination of factors: namely duty rates not being uprated consistently over 
time, as well as pre-tax drinks prices not increasing as rapidly as other goods in the economy.  
Figure 20 Indices of earnings and prices, 2000 = 100  
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Alcohol duty, prices and consumer behaviour 
Consumer demand for specific alcoholic beverages is a function of: 
1. The price of specific products  
2. The price of substitute products  
3. Incomes  
4. Consumer tastes and preferences 
The price and income sensitivity of products are called, in economic terms, the price and income 
elasticities of demand. Own-price elasticities of demand relate to how sensitive demand is to 
changes in the own price of the product, while cross-price elasticities of demand relate to how 
sensitive demand for a product is to changes in the price of other products. For example, the 
cross-price elasticity of cider with respect to beer refers to how sensitive cider demand is to 
changes in the price of beer.  
A wide range of studies have been produced exploring the price sensitivity of alcohol demand. 
While, as intuitively expected, such studies tend to show alcohol demand declining in response 
to price rises, estimates of the extent to which demand falls in response to price changes vary 
significantly. A literature review  by HM Revenue and Customs, for example, showed that 
estimated own-price elasticities of demand for beer varied from -0.09 (very insensitive to price) 
to -3.20 (highly sensitive to price). There are also wide variations in estimated demand 
elasticities for wine and spirits.  
Table 1 Range of own price elasticity estimates from UK alcohol studies 
 
Alcohol type Literature median Literature mean Literature range 
Beer -0.44 -0.60 -0.09 to -3.20 
Wine -0.78 -0.86 -0.14 to -2.42 
Spirits -0.72 -0.75 -0.08 to -1.60 
Source: HMRC Working Paper 16 
We note, from our roundtable discussions with both industry and health experts, that the issue 
of price sensitivity of alcohol demand is a significant source of contention. Several experts we 
spoke to within the alcohol industry, and alcohol trade bodies, felt that government analysis often 
understated the extent to which demand for alcohol is price sensitive. Disputation over the 
veracity of elasticities assumed by policymakers is thus a key part of the debate around alcohol 
taxation.  
One issue in the debate around elasticities of demand is widespread misunderstanding of how 
to interpret elasticities. Critically, price elasticities of demand refer to the expected demand 
response to marginal price changes, rather than substantial price changes. They might not tell 
us much about how demand will respond to significant changes to the duty system. There is no 
reason why the elasticity of demand should be constant for a product, at every price level.  
Another consideration is that elasticities also vary significantly across different types of drinker. 
Evidence suggests that heavy drinkers and those with alcohol-dependence issues tend to be 
less price sensitive than other types of drinker14 - at least in terms of overall alcohol consumption. 
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For a particular type of beverage, they might be more price sensitive, switching to other types of 
alcoholic drink in the event of price rises.  
A range of studies suggest that, overall, alcohol taxation can curb excessive consumption and 
generate improved health and other social outcomes. The Alcohol Policy Model developed by 
academics at the University of Sheffield has estimated, for example, that a 10% increase in all 
alcohol taxes would reduce annual alcohol-attributable deaths by 2.9%15. The World Health 
Organisation argues that “an increase in excise taxes on alcoholic beverages is a proven measure 
to reduce harmful use of alcohol and it provides governments with revenue to offset the 
economic costs of harmful use of alcohol”16. 
Evidence from countries that have drastically altered alcohol taxation also provide “natural 
experiments” into the links between excise duty, alcohol consumption and alcohol-related 
harms. In 2004, Finland reduced spirits, beer and wine taxation by 44%, 32% and 10% 
respectively. Alcohol consumption increased 10% in 2004. With few exceptions, alcohol-related 
harms increased. Alcohol-induced liver disease deaths increased the most, by 46% in 2004-06 
compared to 2001-03, which indicates a strong effect on pre-2004 heavy drinkers. Consumption 
and harms increased most among middle-aged and older segments of the population, and harms 
in the worst-off parts of the population in particular17. 
 
Is alcohol duty “regressive”? 
One common feature of the debate around alcohol duty (and indeed other “sin taxes” such as 
tobacco duty), are arguments around the distributional consequences of such taxes. Those 
calling for lower or frozen rates of duty often argue that taxes such as alcohol duty are regressive 
– disproportionately affecting those on lower incomes.  This is a position advanced by the free 
market think tank the Institute of Economic Affairs, for example18.  
Yet the notion that alcohol duty is regressive is questionable. A 2011 report by the Institute for 
Fiscal Studies argued that, “if anything, [alcohol price rises are] broadly progressive [in response 
to a 5% increase in prices]: the worse-off households lose around 0.1% of their budget on 
average compared to almost 0.2% for those further up the expenditure distribution”19.  
Even if alcohol duty is regressive, it might be justifiable (to some) on public health grounds. Some 
might point to the substantial health inequalities which exist in the UK and argue that higher rates 
of alcohol duty are a price worth paying to address this, if they lead to lower rates of consumption 
and improved health outcomes. As we discuss in the health chapter of this report, evidence 
suggests that alcohol consumption might be more damaging, on average, to low income 
consumers. This is in part because alcohol-related harms appear to be multiplicative, having even 
greater impact when combined with other lifestyle factors such as smoking and poor diet – which 
tend to be more prevalent among lower income households. As we touch on later, there is 
growing discussion among policymakers around the extent to which lifestyle choices – such as 
smoking or drinking excessively – are “freely” made. Evidence suggests that the stress of being 
on a low income and under financial pressure can drive irrational choices which individuals would 
not countenance under more fortuitous circumstances.  
Another point worth noting – which is often left out of public discussions around policy – is that 
even if one cares strongly about distributional outcomes, a regressive policy measure might still 
be desirable if it leads to other benefits, such as a more efficient tax system or improved health 
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and social outcomes. Financial inequalities are probably better dealt with through benefits or 
general taxation reforms rather than through “sin taxes”. In that sense, the distributional 
arguments around sin taxes, and indeed many other policies, are something of a red herring. As 
the Institute for Fiscal Studies has argued:  
“A common objection to the use of excise duties as corrective taxes is that they are regressive. 
However, this does not provide a strong argument against setting rates to fully correct 
externalities and internalities. What matters for meeting distributive goals is the distributional 
impact of the tax and benefit system as a whole, not the progressivity or regressivity of any single 
tax. In general, policymakers should seek to meet distributive goals through adjustments to the 
income tax and benefit system, and should primarily focus excise taxes on targeting market 
failures. Of course, understanding the distributional impact of excise taxes can be important in 
determining how to adjust other aspects of the tax and benefit system to offset excise tax reforms 
that on their own would be regressive.”20 
 
Summary 
This chapter has examined, in detail, trends in alcohol consumption across the UK. It identifies 
several important trends: 
• Alcohol consumption, per capita, remains much higher than in the 1960s, despite 
declining from a peak in 2004. Recent years have shown alcohol consumption starting to 
rise again.  
• There has been a trend over time towards consuming higher strength products, with 
consumers shifting away from beer and towards wine and spirits. 
• Higher income groups tend to consume more alcohol. 
• There are significant regional variations in alcohol consumption, with spirits accounting 
for a higher proportion of all alcohol consumed in Scotland. Scots are also more likely to 
binge drink. 
• Heavy drinkers account for the overwhelming majority of all alcohol consumed in the 
United Kingdom. 
• Heavy drinkers or more likely to consume high strength products and consume relatively 
more alcohol in the off-trade.  
• Alcohol demand tends to decline as prices rise, though estimates of the degree of price 
sensitivity vary significantly.  
• Alcohol duty accounts for a substantial portion of the price consumers face in the off-
trade. 
• Spirits consumption in the on-trade appears to be markedly different than consumption 
in the off-trade, with the on-trade market more geared towards premium products.  
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6. ALCOHOL DUTY, HEALTH AND SOCIETY  
As we have discussed, beyond being a source of additional revenue for the Exchequer, a key 
motivation for alcohol taxation is the need to address the externalities generated by alcohol 
consumption. In economic terms, an externality refers to a cost that is not properly reflected in 
the market price of a good or a service. This occurs when an individual’s consumption of a 
product has wider social implications – the cost of the product reflects the value the individual 
places on it, and manufacturing costs but not the costs that wider society bears as a result of its 
consumption.  
The taxation of motor fuel, for example, reflects the need to better ensure that costs associated 
with pollution and congestion are reflected in the prices that motorists pay for petrol and diesel. 
In the case of alcohol consumption, taxation should, in theory, cover alcohol-related 
externalities, such as: 
• Alcohol-related crime 
• Costs to the National Health Service associated with alcohol consumption 
• Other social costs such as family breakdown. 




A mixed evidence base on mild-to-moderate alcohol consumption...  
Understanding the health outcomes associated with alcohol consumption presents several 
statistical challenges. One is the fact that non-drinkers often have very different characteristics 
to drinkers; for example, many suffer a health condition which is at least part of the reason for 
them not drinking. Given this, it makes it difficult to make an “apples with apples” comparison 
between drinkers and non-drinkers. 
Another challenge in understanding the health impacts of alcohol consumption is the quality of 
the data – including potential under or overreporting in survey datasets. Furthermore, data on 
alcohol expenditure over a time period might not be fully indicative of personal levels of alcohol 
consumption over the same time period. Someone might buy a bottle of whisky as a gift for 
someone else, for example. Consumption of a bottle of whisky might be spread over the course 
of a year or several years, rather than shortly after purchase. The extent to which individuals 
binge drink or spread their alcohol consumption across the week is also likely to have an impact 
on health outcomes, as are other behaviours that individuals engage in. As we discuss in this 
chapter, there is evidence suggesting that alcohol-related harms multiply when combined with 
other behaviours such as smoking of having a poor diet – further complicating the relationship 
between consumption and health outcomes. 
There are also likely to be challenges in identifying, with certainty, alcohol-related deaths. While 
some diseases such as liver cirrhosis might be easily attributable to alcohol consumption, others 
(such as breast cancer) might be more difficult to link to an individual’s drinking patterns.  
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A reasonable summary of the health impacts of alcohol consumption is that the evidence base is 
mixed for mild-to-moderate consumption, while there is clear, indisputable evidence that heavy 
drinking is injurious to health.  
On mild-to-moderate consumption, some of the most widely publicised studies in recent 
decades on alcohol and health have pointed to benefits – including lower rates of heart disease 
from drinking red wine, However, the British Heart Foundation notes that the relationship 
between wine and health is a complicated one: 
“There is some evidence that a moderate intake of alcohol brings a small reduction in heart disease 
risk. But this is not the case for other conditions, such as stroke and vascular dementia, and alcohol 
is linked to some cancers.” – British Heart Foundation website 
A widely publicised 2018 study, published in the Lancet, argued that there was “no safe level” of 
alcohol consumption, stating that “the level of consumption that minimises health loss is zero”21 
However, this conclusion is debatable. For example, David Spiegelhalter, a statistician at the 
University of Cambridge, noted that this conclusion exaggerates the risks to mild drinkers, which 
he describes as “very low risk”22. Further, Spiegelhalter noted that another article published in 
the Lancet earlier in 2018 showed worse health outcomes for those that do not drink at all, 
compared to those that drink modest amounts of alcohol23. This is likely to reflect differences in 
data and modelling used between the two studies, in addition to the different health outcome 
measures adopted.  
Although mixed, there appears to be a general trend in the evidence base on alcohol 
consumption – away from studies pointing to potential benefits from consumption towards 
studies suggesting limited benefits and potential harms from even moderate consumption.  In 
the Chief Medical Officers’ (CMOs’) 2016 Alcohol Guidelines Review,  it was noted that the 
“evidence supporting protective effects today is now weaker than it was at the time of the 
[Department for Health] 1995 [Sensible Drinking] report and there are substantial uncertainties 
around direct attribution to alcohol of the level of protection still observed”24.  
In examining how the evidence on regular drinking has changed since 1995, the CMOs’ 
guidelines noted that “there is much more evidence on the link between alcohol and cancer – 
alcohol is now recognised as a cause of certain cancers by the International Agency for Research 
on Cancer”. Given this, the CMOs’ guidelines argue for a more cautious approach to even mild 
and moderate levels of alcohol consumption:  
“A consequence of [the evidence on alcohol and cancer] is that drinking any amount of alcohol 
regularly can cause harm; the risks of cancer for most people are present even at a low level of 
consumption, but are lower if drinking is within the proposed weekly guidelines levels”. 
 
… but clear health-related harms among heavy drinkers 
While the evidence on mild-to-moderate alcohol consumption and health is relatively mixed, it is 
clear the heavy drinking is associated with a range of health problems – including heart disease, 
cancer and liver disease. Any benefits from alcohol consumption are negated beyond a certain 
level of consumption; the CMOs’ Alcohol Guidelines Review noted that any cardio-protective 
effects of moderate alcohol consumption are cancelled out by irregular heavy drinking occasions 
mixed with low-to-moderate consumption, for example25.  
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According to NHS data, there were 5,843 alcohol-specific deaths in England in 2017, 16% higher 
than a decade earlier. This is despite a decline in per capita alcohol consumption over this period, 
highlighting some of the complexities in linking aggregate alcohol consumption data to health 
and mortality data26.  Ultimately, the distribution of drinking across the population matters.  
Alcoholic liver disease accounted for 80% of the 5,843 alcohol-specific deaths. A further 9% 
were from mental and behavioural disorders due to the use of alcohol.  
Long-term time series data from the World Health Organisation highlights the dramatic increase 
in liver disease in the UK in recent decades, reflecting higher rates of alcohol consumption. While 
in the 1960s the UK had a much lower rate of liver disease and cirrhosis deaths than other 
European countries such as France, Spain and Italy – the UK now has a higher rate of deaths. 
While these countries have seen death rates decline dramatically since the 1960s, they have 
increased sharply in the UK.   
 
Figure 21 Age-standardised liver disease and cirrhosis death rates, per 100,000, aged 0-64, 1968-2015 
 
 
Source: WHO European HPA Database 
Alcohol and health inequalities   
Alcohol-related deaths are concentrated heavily in deprived areas of the United Kingdom. 
According to ONS data, alcohol-specific death rates among men in the most deprived quintile of 
the population (as measured by the Index of Multiple Deprivation), are 4.3 times higher than for 
men in the least deprived quintile. For women, age-standardised death rates are 3.4 times 
higher. There is a growing public debate around the substantial and widening health inequalities 
that exist in the UK – and alcohol-related harms appear to be contributing to these health 
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The concentration of alcohol-specific deaths in deprived areas presents something of a paradox, 
given that (as we discussed in the previous chapter) alcohol consumption tends to increase with 
personal incomes. Indeed, this disparity is referred to as the “Alcohol Harm Paradox”27.  Potential 
explanations for the Paradox include: 
1. High income earners being more likely to offset the negative impact of alcohol with better 
lifestyle choices in other areas in terms of health outcomes – for example by exercising 
and eating a relatively healthy diet.28 
2. Low-income earners making worse lifestyle decisions that exacerbate alcohol-related 
problems such as smoking and poor diet29. Such lifestyle decisions might reflect the 
stress and other negative effects associated with being on a low income and under 
financial pressure.  
3. Data quality issues – high income earners could have issues exacerbated or caused by 
alcohol consumption, but negative outcomes not registered as alcohol-related30 
4. High income earners are more likely to be receiving more regular, better quality 
healthcare. 
5. Heterogeneity in type/strength of alcohol consumed (as shown in SMF analysis in the 
preceding chapter). 
6. Experiencing poverty may impact on health, not only through leading an unhealthy 
lifestyle but also as a direct consequence of poor material circumstances and 
psychosocial stresses.31 Poverty may therefore reduce resilience to disease, predisposing 
people to greater health harms of alcohol.  
7. Regional variations in drinking culture (as shown in SMF analysis in the preceding 
chapter). 
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9. Extremely heavy drinking, at the tail end of the distribution of alcohol consumption, being 
more concentrated among lower income households. For example, data for Scotland 
show that average alcohol consumption among those exceeding weekly guidelines is 
higher among those on lower incomes32. That is to say, while a smaller proportion of low 
income households exceed weekly alcohol consumption guidelines, those that do on 
average consume more compared to higher income heavy drinkers.  
Recent attempts to explain the causes of the Alcohol Harm Paradox suggest that interactions 
with other health challenging behaviours such as smoking, excess weight and poor diet/exercise 
have an important role to play. However, to date there is no comprehensive explanation – 
highlighting the need for further research on this topic.  
 
Other impacts 
Beyond health-related externalities, excessive alcohol consumption generates a range of other 
social externalities. This Includes crime and family breakdown, and accidents causing deaths to 
other people. 
For example, in 2016/17 in England and Wales, 12.4% of theft offences, 20.6% of criminal damage 
and 21.5% of hate crimes were alcohol-related. This rises to 35.8% for sexual assault cases. 
Offenders were believed to be under the influence of alcohol in 39% of all violent incidents.  
Across Great Britain, there were 9,040 drink-drive casualties and 6,070 drink-drive accidents33. 
A recent Public Health England report, drawing on a wide range of survey evidence from across 
the globe, drew attention to the link between alcohol consumption and family breakdown. This 
includes intimate partners having to leave home due to a person’s drinking or having to end the 
relationship with the drinker due to their alcohol consumption34. 
 
Monetising the social costs of alcohol 
A small number of studies have attempted to quantify, in monetary terms, the total social 
externalities generated by excessive alcohol consumption.  In addition to the financial costs to 
government from increased demand on NHS and police resources, these studies sometimes 
attempt to monetise  less tangible costs – such as reduced health quality, grief and informal care 
costs for families.  
A recent Public Health England report, summarising the evidence base on alcohol-related harm, 
set out three major categories for harm35: 
1. The direct economic costs of alcohol consumption, such as health and social care, the 
police and criminal justice, and unemployment and welfare systems.  
2. The indirect costs of alcohol consumption, such as lost productivity, unemployment, 
reduced earnings potential and lost working years due to premature pension or death.  
3. The intangible costs of alcohol consumption, such as pain, suffering, poor quality of life 
and costs from money spent on alcohol in families where money should be spent on other 
things. 
SOCIAL MARKET FOUNDATION 
43 
 
Direct costs of alcohol abuse are typically borne by government, whereas indirect costs tend to 
be borne by society at large and intangible costs by drinkers, their families and their associates. 
The distribution of the burden of alcohol-related costs has important implications for how alcohol 
should be taxed, as we discuss later in this report. 
A cross country study by Rehm et al estimated the total costs of alcohol to be 2.5% of GDP in 
2007, equivalent to £47 billion in 2016. 72% of these costs were indirect costs. 13% were health 
costs and 12% were other direct costs36. 
A widely-quoted study by the Cabinet Office estimated the economic costs of alcohol in England 
at £21bn in 2012 – equivalent to 1.3% of GDP.  This estimate took account of alcohol-related 
health disorders and disease, crime and antisocial behaviour, loss of productivity in the 
workplace and problems for those who misuse alcohol and their families, including domestic 
violence. 
As Public Health England, in their summary of the evidence base, note, few studies in the existing 
research report costs on the magnitude of harm to people other than the drinker, such as crime, 
violence and to the developing foetus in the case of pregnant women. Given this, published 
estimates might underestimate the scale of alcohol-related harms. 
Overall, there are limited estimates to the total costs of alcohol consumption to society. Many of 
the figures used in the public debate on this are dated, as well as being sensitive to assumptions. 
There is a need for more up to date and accurate data on the costs of alcohol consumption, 
particularly given the scale of these costs should have a bearing on the overall rate of alcohol 
taxation, as we discuss below.  
 
Implications for alcohol taxation 
From a health perspective, alcohol policy should aim, particularly, to curb heavy consumption of 
alcohol (or at least ensure that heavy drinkers pay for the externalities they generate) – as this is 
where the evidence, indisputably, shows strong negative health and other social outcomes. 
Evidence on the health impacts of low-to-moderate consumption compared with total 
abstinence from alcohol are more mixed - though of course this might change in the future as 
evidence bases continue to develop. There has been a general trend in the evidence base on 
alcohol consumption towards studies casting doubt on health benefits of moderate 
consumption, and increased evidence of risks from moderate consumption such as higher rates 
of cancer.  
Given that, as we showed earlier, heavy drinkers are more likely to consume cheaper and higher 
strength products, there is a case, from a public health perspective, for focusing taxation and 
other policy tools on these types of drink. Further, we note that heavy drinking is more 
concentrated in off-trade rather than on-trade consumption, suggesting duty should be more 
focused on off-trade consumption too. 
A particular concern with spirits, given their strength, is that it is relatively easy to consume 
excessive amounts of alcohol rapidly. This might explain some of the links between product 
strength, levels of consumption and alcohol related harms. However, the evidence base on the 
extent to which spirits are or are not inherently more harmful than other drinks appears limited – 
there is scope for more research on this topic.  
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Given that alcohol consumption generates externalities – impacting government, families and 
other individuals as well as the direct consumers of alcohol – the overall rate of alcohol taxation 
should be reflective of the size of these externalities.    
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7.  ALCHOHOL DUTY, JOBS AND THE ECONOMY  
One of the most widely-used justifications for changes in alcohol duty policy – particularly 
freezes and cuts to duty – is the need to support jobs in alcohol related industries. This includes 
direct employment in alcoholic beverage production, as well as employment in pubs, bars and 
the hospitality sector more broadly. Others point to jobs along the supply chain, which are 
supported by the production of alcoholic beverages. 
One issue with the political discourse around jobs and alcohol production is the tendency of the 
debate to focus on employment in a particular industry rather than consider an economy-wide 
perspective. Given the health costs of excessive alcohol consumption, jobs are lost, as well as 
created, through production of alcoholic drinks. Further, productivity losses associated with 
excessive consumption – from hangovers to more serious health conditions – have a negative 
impact of economic outcomes, including jobs.  
We need a more nuanced public debate on alcohol consumption and jobs which acknowledges 
this relatively complicated picture and considers the economy-wide impact on employment – 
both at a country and regional level. We also need to acknowledge the dynamic nature of the 
economy; job losses at a point in time are often replaced with jobs created elsewhere or within 
the same industry. A tax policy that leads to job losses in the production of “high harm” beverages 
might have a negative impact on jobs in the short run, but a positive impact on jobs in the 
medium-to-long run – as those that lose their jobs find work elsewhere, and as health benefits 
lead to improved rates of employment among heavy drinkers. Further, we would expect some 
producers of “high harm” beverages such as strong white ciders, to perhaps move into other, 
less harmful product markets (such as lower strength cider) rather than sack workers following 
a tax rise. 
This chapter explores the link between alcohol consumption, jobs and the economy in more 
detail – testing the extent to which common jobs-related arguments stand up to scrutiny.  
 
How many jobs are directly supported by the alcohol industry? 
According to the Business Register and Employment Survey, there were 27,000 workers directly 
employed in the manufacture of spirits, wine, cider and beer in Great Britain in 2017 – 0.1% of 
total employee jobs. Of this, over half (16,000) was employment in the manufacture of beer. 
Spirits was the next largest employer, with 9,000 directly employed in production. Despite having 
a great deal of prominence in the public debate around alcohol duty, and having by far the most 
favourable duty status of all beverages, cider production directly employs just 2,000 workers in 
Britain.  
A greater number of people are employed in public houses, clubs and bars – 521,000 people in 
2017 and 1.8% of all employee jobs in Great Britain. 16,000 were employed in retail outlets where 
the sale of beverages dominates (such as off-licences) and 441,000 were employed in licensed 
restaurants. It would be incorrect to say that employment in pubs, bars and restaurants is entirely 
dependent on alcohol consumption, given that revenue is also generated from food and non-
alcoholic drinks. Indeed, pubs have become increasingly dependent on food as a source of 
revenue in recent decades.   
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Figure 23 Number of individuals employed in industry, and % of total GB employee jobs, 2017 
 
 
Source: Business Register and Employment Survey 
Industry figures often report on the “wider economic impact” of alcohol production. This includes 
jobs supported along supply chains, and also jobs supported by the spending power of 
employees in the alcohol industry – what economists refer to, respectively, as “indirect” and 
“induced” economic impacts. The Wine and Spirits Trade Association 2017 Market Overview 
states that wine and spirits directly and indirectly support 554,000 jobs37.  A study by Oxford 
Economics for the British Beer and Pub Association found that, in 2009/10, beer and pub activity 
supported just under a million jobs, including indirect and induced employment impacts38.   
With respect to cider, close links to apple farming are noted; about half of all apples produced in 
Great Britain go into the manufacture of cider39. According to the National Association of Cider 
Makers, the industry supports 11,000 jobs40. 
 
What is the regional distribution of this employment? 
The current alcohol duty regime is often defended on the grounds of the need to protect jobs in 
parts of the country where other sources of employment are scarce. Such arguments are 
particularly strongly used with respect to cider and spirits duty. 
It is indeed true that employment in these industries has a strong regional focus, as the graphs 
below examining employee jobs by local authority show. About 40% of direct employment in cider 
& perry production in Great Britain is in Herefordshire. Employment in spirits production is also 
concentrated in Scottish local authorities.  
Yet, despite this regional concentration of employment in alcohol production, it is important to 
put this into perspective – looking at alcoholic beverage production as a share of total 
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2017 – hardly suggestive of an economy that would be devastated if some jobs were lost in cider 
employment (for example, following a tax move which forces low quality, low cost, high strength 
ciders out of the market).  
Figure 24 Employment in beer production – top 10 local authorities  
 
Source: Business Register and Employment Survey 
Figure 25 Employment in cider and perry production – top 10 local authorities  
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Figure 26 Employment in wine production – top 9 local authorities  
 
 
Source: Business Register and Employment Survey 
Figure 27 Employment in spirits production – top 10 local authorities  
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In terms of economies being reliant on alcohol production for employment, the argument for this 
is perhaps stronger at face value in Scotland. In the local authorities of Moray and West 
Dunbartonshire, for example, spirits production directly accounted for 2.9% and 2.6% of 
employment respectively. Yet, as we discuss below, the links between spirits consumption and 
jobs in the UK are notably weak, reflecting the fact that the vast majority of spirits are exported 
rather than consumed in the UK. 
 
What is the link between alcohol consumption and employment in alcohol-related 
industries?  
The analysis above has shown that, while employment in some types of alcohol production is 
regionally concentrated, it would be a distortion of truth to claim that regional economies are 
heavily reliant on these industries for work – even in the most extreme cases. Yet, much of the 
public and political rhetoric continues to overstate the relative importance of industries such as 
cider and spirits production to local jobs markets.  
Another matter often overlooked in the political discourse is the link between domestic alcohol 
production and employment in these industries. Given that consumers drink imported as well as 
domestically-produced alcoholic beverages, the link between alcohol consumption and jobs is 
not straightforward. Further, the UK exports alcoholic beverages; meaning employment might be 
more closely tied to consumption elsewhere in the world. 
This is indeed borne out in the data graphed in Figure 30 – which shows scatter plots of 
employment in alcohol-related industries, against levels of domestic consumption over time. 
Beer employment is most closely tied to domestic alcohol consumption levels – around half of 
the variation in jobs growth over the time period charted is explained by changing levels of 
domestic consumption4. In contrast, domestic consumption of spirits explains less than 20% of 
the variation in employment in spirits production since the year 2000.  
This is not surprising, given that a high share of spirits are exported from the UK. In the case of 
the Scotch whisky industry, about 90% of production is exported41. Given this, trends in domestic 
alcohol consumption are likely to have a limited impact on employment in the whisky industry. 
Indeed, analysis of HMRC alcohol statistics, graphed below, show that most of the growth in 
domestic spirits consumption has been from other spirits (such as vodka), rather than whisky. 
UK-produced whisky accounted for just 17% of spirits consumption in 2018/19, down from 35% 
in 1999/00, with the absolute volume of whisky consumed in the UK down by over 30% over this 
time period. UK-produced whisky consumption fell by 9% between 1999/00 and 2006/07 – a 
time period over which spirits duty was frozen – while consumption of imported and other spirits 
such as vodka increased by a third (33%). It was thus these drinks, rather than whisky, that were 
the prime beneficiaries of the duty freeze over this time period.   
Whisky’s dominance in the political discourse around spirits, with its evocation of images of 
charming rural distilleries in remote locations, thus seems highly misguided. Data from the Wine 
and Spirits Trade Association show that vodka is the most widely consumed spirit in the UK, 
accounting for about 30% of total consumption. 
                                                     
4 Based on the R-square value from a simple univariate regression. 
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Figure 28 Net quantities of spirits charged with duty, hectolitres of pure alcohol 
 
 
Source: HMRC alcohol duty bulletin 
Figure 29 UK spirits sales, breakdown by product category, 2016 
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Figure 31  explores the correlation between employment in pubs, bars & clubs, and consumption 
of different types of alcoholic beverage in the UK. UK-wide beer consumption accounts for about 
54% of the variation in employment in pubs, bars and clubs since 2000. In contrast, levels of 
spirits and wine consumption show less correlation, while cider consumption is negatively 
correlated with employment in pubs, bars and clubs.  
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Spirits consumption, million litres of pure alcohol
Are jobs lost elsewhere in the economy as a result of alcohol consumption?  
Much of the policy debate around alcohol taxation is focused on employment in alcohol-related 
industries. Relatively little is focused on the jobs that are lost in the economy as a result of 
alcohol-related harms, yet these are likely to be significant. As well as unemployment, alcohol-
related harms can result in increased sick days, and reduced rates of productivity at work (often 
referred to as “presenteeism”) – leading to lower rates of economic output. A proper analysis of 
the economic impact of alcohol consumption should consider such factors as well.  
Analysis by Public Health England found that, in 2015, there were 167,000 working years of life 
lost due to alcohol consumption – 16% of all working years lost in that year. Premature deaths 
from liver disease as a result of alcohol consumption led to 50,000 working years of life lost, and 
more working years were lost to alcohol than the ten leading causes of cancer death combined42. 
Working years of life lost are calculated as the number of years between a death in those aged 
16-64 years and the age of 65 years.  
A study by MacDonald and Shields found that problem drinking – drinking over 45 units of alcohol 
per week, or reporting things like guilt, loss of control and feeling the need to cut down on 
drinking in the morning – reduces the likelihood of working between 7% and 31%43. A 2011 
literature review of eight studies showed all eight indicating a link between heavy drinking and 
increased risk of unemployment44.   
 
Implications for alcohol taxation  
This chapter argues that some of the common jobs-related arguments used to justify alcohol duty 
freezes or “favourable treatment” do not stand up to scrutiny. Even in the local authorities where 
cider production is heavily concentrated, it does not account for a significant share of total 
employment. With 90% of Scotch whisky exported from the United Kingdom, domestic duty 
policy and domestic levels of consumption have relatively little bearing on levels of employment. 
Further, vodka, not whisky, is the most popular spirit consumed in the UK.  
Only for beer does there appear to be a strong link between domestic consumption and 
employment in production – as well as in pubs, bars and clubs. This suggests that, if alcohol duty 
policy were to be used in a way to support jobs in the economy, beer would be a more logical 
candidate for favourable treatment than spirits or cider. Even then, it remains unclear why alcohol 
duty should be the “go to” instrument for supporting jobs in the economy -as opposed to other 
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8. PRINCIPLES OF A NEW ALCOHOL DUTY REGIME 
The preceding chapters of the report have explored the “drinking landscape” in the UK – trends 
in alcohol consumption, the health and social implications, and the linkages between alcohol, 
the economy and jobs. We also explored the structure of the current alcohol duty regime in the 
UK and the inconsistencies within it.  
As we have discussed, the current duty regime is not fit for purpose. We have shown in this report 
that alcohol-related harm is concentrated heavily on particular beverages – higher strength, 
lower cost products, relatively concentrated in the off-trade. Yet, the prevailing duty regime does 
a poor job at focusing taxation on where harms are being generated. Rather than encouraging 
the consumption and production of lower strength wine and cider, for example, the current duty 
regime incentivises the production of higher strength products – given that duty per unit of 
alcohol tends to fall with product strength. 
We also showed, in the preceding chapter, the dubious nature of many of the jobs-related 
arguments used to defend alcohol duty freezes and cuts. Beyond beer, linkages between alcohol 
consumption and jobs in their manufacturing seem relatively weak. 
Given this, this chapter sets out five principles which we think should underpin a reformed 
alcohol duty system in the UK.  The focus of these principles is on ensuring that alcohol duty is 
higher for the products which generate the most social and economic harms, and lower for 
products which are less harmful. As well as generating improved health outcomes – for example 
through incentivising the production of lower strength products – our proposed reforms to the 
alcohol duty system would also be better from a consumer welfare point of view, given that they 
would reduce the relative focus of taxation on mild-to-moderate drinkers that do not generate 
substantial harms to themselves or society at large.  
 
Recommendation 1: Introducing a duty strength escalator, to focus alcohol taxation on 
higher strength product 
We noted in Chapter 4 that the heaviest drinkers in the UK are more likely to consume higher 
strength products. They are more likely to consume spirits, as well as higher strength beers and 
ciders. Given this, we believe that a duty strength escalator should form a key component of a 
revised alcohol duty system. 
A strength escalator would work by applying a multiplier to alcohol duty, according to the strength 
of the product. For a multiplier of “1”, for example, the alcohol duty, per unit of alcohol, on a 4% 
ABV cider would be half as much as the duty on an 8% ABV cider. A multiplier greater than 1 would 
penalise higher strength products even more heavily.  The strength multiplier need not be linear.  
In addition to helping to focus alcohol taxes where the social costs are greatest, a strength 
escalator brings with it other benefits in the form of dynamic effects and incentives. By ensuring 
that, unlike the current regime, duty per unit of alcohol increases with product strength, drinks 
manufacturers would have stronger and clearer incentives to produce lower strength products.  
There is at least tentative evidence that alcohol producers respond to duty changes, by 
reformulating products. Carlsberg reduced the strength of its low strength lager, Skol, from 3% 
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to 2.8% ABV, in response to the introduction of a new lower-rate duty band for low strength 
beers45. AB InBev has also reduced the strength of more mainstream brands of beer – including 
Stella Artois, Budweiser and Becks – as a means of reducing costs associated with alcohol duty46. 
Notably, as we discussed earlier, beer is the only alcoholic beverage category where duty per 
unit of alcohol holds steady and increases with product strength5– creating incentives towards 
lower strength products. Extending similar principles to wine, spirits and cider would yield similar 
benefits. 
 
Recommendation 2: Levelling the playing field across same-strength products 
For products of the same alcohol strength, we recommend equalising duty rates. This would 
simplify the duty regime, helping the government meet its goal of simplifying the UK tax regime47.  
Under our proposed approach, a 6% ABV wine and a 6% ABV beer would face the same duty per 
unit of alcohol. Only if products are a different strength would duty rates differ. 
Equalisation of duty rates for same-strength products would probably still generate differences 
in the end-price per unit of alcohol faced by consumers, given variations in pre-tax prices and 
production costs. However, it is unclear that this should be reflected in the tax treatment of 
products, especially if pre-tax price differences reflect relative economic efficiencies and 
inefficiencies in industries.  
We recommend taxing alcohol on a consistent basis, according to the pure alcohol content of 
the beverage. With wine and cider at present taxed according to the volume of the end product, 
rather than the alcohol content, it is difficult to create strong and consistent incentives to 
produce lower strength products.  
 
Recommendation 3: Focusing taxation on the off-trade. Allowing pubs, bars and 
restaurants to claim back a proportion of the duty costs they face with a new “Pub Relief”.  
As we have discussed, as well as consuming stronger products, heavier drinkers are more likely 
to consume alcohol on the off-trade. Therefore, in line with our proposed framework of focusing 
alcohol duty where harms are most generated, we suggest explicitly favouring on-trade 
consumption of alcohol in the tax system.  Beyond health outcomes, there are jobs-related 
justifications for such an approach; as we showed in the previous chapter, the majority of 
alcohol-related employment is in pubs, bars and clubs, rather than in production.  
One way of doing this for beer and cider would be, like Australia, to have favourable rates of duty 
for kegs rather than bottles and cans. However, we note that this does not address spirits, cider 
and wine, where alcohol-related harms are concentrated heavily in off-trade consumption. As we 
noted earlier, the on-trade market for spirits appears notably more “premium” than the off-trade 
market.  
In Ireland, some have proposed a “lid levy” for alcohol purchased in the off-trade48, applied as an 
ad valorem tax (similar to VAT). This would penalise more expensive products more heavily. Given 
                                                     
5 Spirits duty holds steady, but does not increase, with product strength 
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that the evidence base suggests that the heaviest drinkers tend to consume cheaper products, 
this is unlikely to be a well-focused tax.   
A better, and more politically appealing, approach would be to allow pubs, bars and other 
licensed premises to claim back a percentage of the duty costs that they face – a clear policy in 
favour of on-trade consumption.  
Conceivably, this could work in a similar way to Alcoholic Ingredients Relief, which already exists. 
With Alcohol Ingredients Relief, businesses can claim relief on alcohol excise duty when they use 
alcohol as an ingredient in drinks less than 1.2% ABV, chocolates, vinegar and other foods for 
human consumption (below a certain alcohol content). A “Pub Relief” could work in the same 
way, though relief would be a proportion of duty rather than all duty, given that a proportion of 
health and other social harms related to alcohol consumption are generated in the on-trade. 
Beyond Alcohol Ingredients Relief, we note the existence of other reliefs in the alcohol duty 
regime. Small brewers face lower rates of duty than larger ones49.  The existence of other reliefs 
means that a Pub Relief is not without precedent.  
However, despite duty reliefs not being  unprecedented, one barrier to a Pub Relief at present 
are the EU directives on alcohol taxation. In discussions about a “lid levy” in the Republic of 
Ireland, it was argued that such a measure would breach the relevant EU directive on alcohol 
taxation, which requires that such taxes are applied by reference to the nature and strength of 
the product rather than the means of packaging or the location in which the product is sold50. 
Brexit could, potentially, eliminate this barrier to a Pub Relief being introduced. 
Couched in a more positive framing than a “lid levy”, we believe that “Pub Relief” is a more 
politically palatable policy option. From a public health perspective, focusing alcohol taxation on 
the off-trade might be more successful in curbing alcohol consumption. Price in the off-trade is 
easier to influence through duty (and indeed other policy tools such as MUP), given that duty 
accounts for a higher proportion of the final consumer price, as we discussed earlier.  
 
Recommendation 4: Linking alcohol duty to the social costs of alcohol, rather than as a 
cash cow 
There has been a great deal of debate in the UK around the case for or against hypothecating 
certain taxes – ensuring that funds raised from a tax are dedicated to a particular purpose. In the 
case of alcohol taxation, some have argued for duty and other revenues to be hypothecated for 
healthcare spending.  
We believe that the amount of revenue raised from alcohol duty should be closely tied to a 
measure of the total social costs of alcohol in the United Kingdom – including health and crime-
related costs to government, as well as costs faced by wider society such as family breakdown. 
This is somewhat different from hypothecation, as we are not suggesting that revenues should 
be dedicated to a particular resource such as healthcare or policing. Hypothecation in that way 
carries with it the risk of funds being used inefficiently rather than where most needed. 
We caution against using niche taxes, such as alcohol duty, as a general form of revenue-raising 
for the Exchequer, particularly given that structural changes in consumer behaviour which could 
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end up leaving a hole in the public finances in the long-term. As the Institute for Fiscal Studies 
has noted, the UK public finances already suffer from increased reliance on relatively small taxes, 
with “insufficient consideration of how they might operate within a well-designed tax system”51 
We emphasise that our suggestion of linking tax take to the costs of alcohol does not reduce its 
setting to a purely empirical exercise around the measuring the health and social costs. 
Ultimately, decisions on overall tax take will depend on the wishes of politicians and the public 
more broadly – specifically around the degree of “paternalism” embedded in the UK tax system.  
At the very least, alcohol duty should cover the health, crime and welfare costs to government 
and wider society (the “externalities” associated with alcohol consumption). As we have 
discussed, there are currently limited and dated estimates of the value of these externalities; 
there is a need for updated analysis if we are to ensure that alcohol taxation is set at an 
appropriate level.  
More debatable than the need for alcohol duty to cover the externalities of alcohol consumption, 
is the extent to which the private costs to the drinker, such as reduced earnings potential and 
wellbeing, should be reflected in the overall rate of taxation. 
Social libertarians will argue that private costs should not be reflected in alcohol duty regime, 
given that they might reflect an individual’s lifestyle choices and preferences. Conceivably, some 
believe worse health outcomes are a price worth paying for enjoying activities such as smoking 
and heavy drinking. 
More paternalistic individuals argue that individuals often make ill-informed choices which they 
end up regretting once they face the consequences. Indeed, there appears to be growing 
support for some degree of paternalism in the economy, particularly in light of the emerging 
evidence base around the links between mental health, poverty and decision-making. Financial 
stress, mental health problems and a host of other issues are associated with a constrained 
ability of individuals to make “rational” decisions52. In addition, lack of access to advice, 
information and support can also hinder decision-making.    
We do not take a strong position on the degree of paternalism that should be embedded in the 
alcohol duty system in this report – ultimately, we believe this is a matter for politicians and the 
electorate. Our key argument is that tax take from alcohol duty should be focused on alcohol-
related costs, whether that be the externalities of alcohol consumption or a broader measure 
covering private costs drinkers. Alcohol duty should not be used as a cash cow for government 
beyond this, given the risk of exacerbating the UK’s already problematic reliance on niche taxes. 
Beyond some measurement issues associated with alcohol-related harms, is the intertemporal 
dimension of harm. Alcohol consumption today might not translate into health problems until 
years into the future. Given this, the measure used for calculating alcohol-related harms should 
take into account expected future costs given current consumption levels.  
 
Recommendation 5: Regular uprating and review periods 
As discussed earlier in this report, one of the features of the alcohol duty system in recent years 
has been that it has been subject to a great deal of tinkering - meaning beverages go through 
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periods of duty rises, freezes and cuts with little consideration of the system-wide implications 
– for tax revenues, the economy or health outcomes. 
While we are reasonably agnostic on whether alcohol duty should be uprated by earnings or 
inflation, we believe that a key principle underpinning a reformed alcohol duty regime should be 
an increased element of certainty in how duty is likely to change over time. Rather than being a 
highly politicised policy instrument, the general assumption should be that alcohol duty will rise 
in line with a metric such as inflation or earnings.  
Consistency in uprating is particularly important given our suggestion that the alcohol duty 
system should provide compelling incentives to produce lower strength products. Given that 
product reformulation will require investment and innovation by drinks manufacturers, it is 
important that they operate in an environment of relative certainty around alcohol taxation, at 
least in the medium-term – so they can invest with some degree of certainty around future tax 
policy. 
While we believe inflation or earnings should be the “status quo” form of uprating duty, we this 
should be complemented with review periods, held perhaps on a five or 10 yearly basis. The 
purpose of the review period would be to explore the latest evidence base on alcohol-related 
costs to society, and ensure that alcohol duty tax take is broadly in line with these costs – as we 
proposed in Recommendation 4 above. This review should be informed by expert insights from 
government, the healthcare sector, academics, charities and industry, taking into account the 
latest evidence and structural trends. As we discussed in this report, some of the evidence base, 
for example on the health impacts of mild-to-moderate drinking, remain debatable; conceivably 
estimates of the social cost of alcohol could change significantly as our knowledge-base 
improves. We envision this review being conducted by an independent commission, tasked with 
recommending an overall level of alcohol taxation for government (much as, say, the Low  Pay 
Commission is tasked with advising government on the setting of the National Minimum Wage 
and National Living Wage). 
The review period would provide further incentives for drinks manufacturers to reduce alcohol-
related harms - for example by withdrawing “worst offender” products from the market (such as 
high strength, low quality, low cost drinks) and advertising the risks of excessive consumption 
of alcoholic products. Manufacturers would be incentivised to do this in order to reduce 
structural duty increases following the review period.  
In short, regular uprating of alcohol duty, combined with a holistic review period taking account 
of all the relevant evidence, would help depoliticise alcohol duty and ensure that it is a well-
focused tax with strong incentives for improved economic, social and health outcomes.  
 
European regulations and a “second best” duty regime 
Some of the recommendations we outline above can only be realised in the event of European-
wide regulatory reform, or the UK pursuing a different approach to regulation following Brexit. As 
discussed earlier, European directives bind the UK to taxing wine and cider according to the 
volume rather than the alcohol content of the final product. They also limit the ability to 
differentiate on-trade and off-trade taxation.  
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In addition to the possibility that the UK remains in the EU, or returns to the EU following 
departure, the UK might still be bound by EU regulations following a permanent Brexit. This might 
be a requirement for a successful trade deal with the EU following Brexit, for example.  
Yet, even if European regulations constrain the possibility for duty reform, there is still scope to 
have a more optimal regime than we have at present – one that better focuses taxation where 
harms are being most generated. This includes: 
• Regular uprating and evidence-based duty reviews (as proposed above). 
• Introducing more duty bands for cider (as Ireland has done) to better incentivise the 
production of lower strength products. 
• Bringing beer, cider and wine duty more closely into line in the sub-10% ABV category, for 
similar strength products. 
• Introducing a new duty band for beer, between 2.8% and 3.9% ABV. It was brought up in 
our discussions with industry that there is likely to be a broader market for beverages in 
this kind of strength category, as opposed to the sub 2.8% ABV category which is 
relatively niche. However, the current duty system does not incentivise production of 
such beverages. Alternatively, there may be a case for increasing the upper limit of the “< 
2.8%” beer duty band, to cover low strength beers which are more likely to gain 
mainstream demand.  
• Narrowing the main duty band for wine. In the UK the main duty rate for still wine runs from 
5.5% ABV to 15% ABV. EU law requires that there has to be a single band for wine between 
8.5% and 15% ABV. As the UK’s main still wine and made-wine band is currently 5.5% to 
15% ABV, it would be possible to split the main still wine and made-wine band into two, 
and introduce stronger incentives via duty to produce low strength wines between 5.5% 
ABV and 8.5% ABV.  
As the figure below shows, there is scope, even within current regulatory requirements, to 
structure duty bands and levels in a way that creates stronger incentives to produce lower 
strength products. 
  




Figure 32 Illustration of a reformed duty regime within the constraints of EU regulation – more cider duty 
bands and a greater deal of equivalence between similar strength products 
 
 
Source: SMF analysis 
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9. WHAT WOULD BE THE IMPACT OF DUTY REFORM ON ALCOHOL CONSUMPTION 
AND PRICES?   
The previous chapter of the report set out five principles which should underpin a revised alcohol 
duty system in the UK. This chapter explores, using economic modelling, the potential impact 
that duty reform could have on levels of alcohol consumption and prices for specific products. 
In this chapter, we take no view on what the overall level of alcohol duty revenue should be – as 
we have discussed, we believe this is a somewhat subjective matter dependent on one’s views 
regarding “paternalism”. Given this, we consider revenue-neutral reforms to alcohol duty – 
reforms which would raise the same amount of duty revenue as the current system. 
Assumptions of the model 
Our model of alcohol demand and revenue generated draws on a number of datasets: 
• HMRC estimates of the elasticity of demand for alcohol (tabled below) 
• Data on current alcohol duty rates from the HMRC alcohol duty statistical bulletin 
• Data on on-trade and off-trade prices and sales volumes from the NHS Scotland “MESAS” 
dataset (which includes data for England & Wales as well as Scotland). 
 
Table 2 Price elasticities of demand for alcohol 
 
Source: HMRC estimates 
We assume in our model that the passthrough rate for alcohol duty, across all products, is 100%. 
That is to say, duty is fully passed on to consumers. 
Based on this data, we can then model the impact of alcohol duty changes through the following 
process: 
1. Consumer prices for alcohol are updated in light of the duty changes. 
2. The demand for products is then updated, using the estimated price elasticities of 
demand from HMRC. We estimate, separately, demand for beer, spirits, wine, cider & perry 
and ready-to-drink (RTD) products. Further, we estimate, separately, demand for on-trade 
and off-trade consumption. 
3. Total duty revenue can then be updated to reflect the estimated changes to alcohol 
demand, in addition to the new rates of duty.  
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4. We use the “goal seek” function in Excel in calibrate the model to give revenue-neutral 
duty rates compared with the current duty regime. 
One notable limitation of the model is that it does not take into account the response of producers 
to changes in alcohol duty. As discussed in the previous chapter, we would expect some of our 
proposals to trigger product reformulations (such as reducing strength) as well as the removal of 
some brands from the market.  
For cider, we would expect the removal of its substantial tax advantage under a reformed system 
to lead to a range of innovations in the industry, rather than terminal decline. Presumably, cider 
manufacturers would respond to the removal of tax advantages through, for example, 
premiumisation of the product offer to encourage consumers to spend more money on drinks. 
We would also expect the average strength of cider products to decline.   
The scale of such producer responses is difficult to establish with the current evidence base, 
though as discussed in the preceding chapter, there are recent examples of firms at least 
claiming to have reformulated their products in response to alcohol duty changes. 
 
An example alcohol duty regime 
Below, we give an example on the potential impact that alcohol duty reform could have on 
consumer prices and levels of alcohol consumption. We emphasise that, while this example is 
based on the principles we discussed earlier, we are not endorsing the precise rates of duty here, 
or assumed rates of on-trade duty relief. 
We assume that our proposed “Pub Duty Relief” rate is set at 50% - meaning that duty rates in 
the on-trade are half as much, per unit of alcohol, than on the off-trade – for every product 
category. In theory one could have different rates of on-trade duty relief for different products. 
Though this would complicate the duty system, it might be justified from an “optimal tax” 
perspective. We showed earlier that the extent which on-trade and off-trade consumption differs 
varies across product categories. Spirits consumption in the on-trade is much more “premium” 
than in the off-trade, whereas beer is more similarly dependent on harmful/hazardous drinkers 
in the off-trade and the on-trade. This could be used to justify a higher rate of on-trade duty relief 
for spirits than for beer. Defra Food Survey data also suggest that spirits tend to be diluted 
(mixed) when consumed in the on-trade – providing a further justification for a greater rate of 
on-trade relief.  
We assume in our example that the average off-trade beer duty rate remains unchanged 
compared with the current system.  
There is a fixed duty per unit of alcohol. This is multiplied by a strength multiplier.  
This gives the duty regime graphed in Figure 33. The strength multiplier is steeper at the bottom 
end of the alcohol strength distribution. This creates stronger incentives to produce very low 
strength products. It also helps ensure that duty does not rise to “excessive” levels for the 
highest strength products. The chart also shows the current duty regime for the purpose of 
comparison.  
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Figure 33 Revised alcohol duty per unit, modelled new regime vs current regime 
 
 
Source: SMF analysis 
Impact on prices 
The impact of switching to the regime described above would be to reduce prices of all on-trade 
products except cider. On the off-trade, average end consumer prices would rise on average by 
24% for spirits, 5% for wine and 43% for cider.  Per unit of alcohol, this would still leave cider 
cheaper than spirits or wine in the off-trade, despite a significant increase in average price.  
However, cider would become more expensive than beer on average, reflecting the higher typical 
strength of the product.  
Price rises would be much greater, in percentage terms for cheaper products – given that duty 
is a greater proportion of the final price.  This is shown in the table below which compares the 
price rise of a single malt Scotch whisky with the price rise for a relatively cheap vodka.  From a 
tackling social harm perspective, this is desirable, as we know that the heaviest drinkers tend to 









2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 222324252627 282930 31 323334353637 383940
ABV, %
Beer - current regime Still cider - current regime
Spirits - current regime Still wine - current regime
All products, off-trade, new regime All products, on-trade, new regime
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Figure 34 Consumer prices per unit of alcohol, current versus new regime 
 
 
Source: SMF analysis 
Table 3 Example price changes under new duty regime 
 
Product 






regime £ change 
% 
change 
Pint in a pub - 4.5% lager £3.70 2.6 £3.44 -£0.26 -7.1% 
175ml glass of still wine in a bar - 13% 
ABV £4.50 2.3 £4.23 -£0.27 -6.1% 
Single measure of spirit - 40% ABV £3.50 1 £3.39 -£0.11 -3.0% 
Stella Artois, 4 x 440ml cans, 4.8% ABV £5.50 8.4 £5.75 £0.25 4.6% 
Pint in a pub - 6% cider £3.70 3.4 £3.88 £0.18 4.8% 
750ml bottle of wine bought in a 
supermarket - 13% ABV £6.00 9.8 £6.35 £0.35 5.8% 
Glenmorangie single malt whisky  - 70cl 
bottle in Tesco £36.00 28 £39.77 £3.77 10.5% 
Sainsbury's Basics Vodka - 70cl bottle £10.00 26.3 £13.13 £3.13 31.3% 
Frosty' Jack's Orginal Cider - 2.5 litre 
bottle sold in Iceland, 7.5% ABV £3.70 18.8 £7.37 £3.67 99.2% 













































% change (right-hand axis) Current regime New regime
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Impact on alcohol consumption  
The impact of switching to the duty regime described above would be to cut overall alcohol 
consumption by 5.4%, compared to the current regime.  This would come from a 1.9% decline in 
on-trade alcohol consumption and a 6.8% decline in off-trade consumption.  
On-trade consumption of alcohol falls, in the model, despite declines in on-trade prices. This 
reflects cross elasticities of demand for alcohol products. Increased prices in the off-trade can 
reduce demand in the on-trade as well.  
A 5.4% reduction in alcohol consumption would reduce per capita consumption to its lowest level 
since the early 1970s.  
 
Figure 35 Change in alcohol consumption – new regime versus current regime 
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Figure 36 Per capita pure alcohol consumption among population aged 15 and over, litres, 1961-2018 
 
 
Source: World Health Organisation Global Health Observatory data repository (1961-2009). SMF calculations based on 
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10. CONCLUSIONS  
This report has analysed, in detail, alcohol taxation in the UK and the potential benefits that could 
be realised from reforming it. There is scope for producing a more efficient alcohol duty regime – 
which focuses tax on the most harmful products on the market.  
We emphasise that alcohol duty is just one policy instrument with which government can tackle 
the health and other social harms associated with excessive drinking. Other policy measures that 
have been discussed include minimum unit pricing, advertising restrictions, labelling 
requirements (such as health warnings on drinks) and raising awareness of the harms associated 
with alcohol (via, for example, education).  We do not assess the relative benefits and drawbacks 
of these policies within this report. However, we would expect a reformed alcohol duty regime to 
be complemented with a range of other policy options if government is to effectively address the 
harms caused by excessive alcohol consumption.  
Duty alone cannot be expected to address all the issues associated with excessive alcohol 
consumption though, as the World Health Organisation notes, it is a proven tool for tackling 
harms and ensuring that social harms are reflected in the price of drinks. It thus has a role to play 
alongside the range of other policy options. This report has set out ways of ensuring that duty is 
a more effective policy instrument that it is at present.  
Critically, we emphasise the importance of looking at the alcohol duty system as a whole, rather 
than maintaining the current, heavily politicised approach to alcohol duty which has led to a very 
distorted tax system. There is clearly much more of a role for experts and evidence in the setting 
of alcohol taxation than at present and steps to “depoliticise” the duty setting process should be 
welcomed.  
In this report, we emphasise the importance of incentives and innovation in the drinks industry. 
A reformed alcohol duty system should provide better incentives for drinks manufacturers to 
produce less harmful products, and reforms to beer duty to favour lower strength products 
suggest that producers respond to such incentives.  As well as favouring lower strength products 
in the tax system, linking the overall level of alcohol duty revenue to the social harms of alcohol, 
as we propose in this report, creates further incentives for drinks manufacturers, pubs and other 
licensed premises “to get their house in order” (if they are not already doing so).  If industry 
wants to limit the size of future tax rises, it can do so through encouraging more responsible 
alcohol consumption and removing “worst offender” products such as high-strength, low-
quality, low-price drinks.  
Brexit could open up opportunities for significant reform of the UK’s alcohol duty system, allowing 
the creation of a more rationalised and effective tax regime. This includes enabling on-trade and 
off-trade alcohol consumption to be taxed at different rates and allowing wine and cider to be 
taxed according to their alcohol content, rather than the volume of the final product as is the 
case at present. European directives mean that these reforms are not possible at the moment, 
and we urge policymakers looking for tax and regulatory reforms “unlocked” by Brexit to consider 
the case for rethinking alcohol duty.  
Even if the UK remains bound by EU regulation in the future, for example following a trade 
agreement, there is still scope to significantly improve upon the current duty regime. This 
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includes the creation of more incentives to produce lower strength products, as well as bringing 

















4 Griffith R et al (2013)., ‘Price-based measures to reduce alcohol consumption’, IFS Briefing Note BN138, 
p. 8.  
5 http://www.ukpol.co.uk/ken-clarke-1996-budget-statement/  
6 PwC (2010), “Taxing the brewing sector: a European analysis of the costs of producing beer and 
the impact of excise duties” 






10 https://www.theguardian.com/news/datablog/2011/jul/05/wine-strengths-country  
11 Local Government Association (2016), “Alcohol Pre-Loading: Survey of Licensing Authorities”  
12 Bhattacharya, Angus et al (2018), “How dependent is the alcohol industry on heavy drinking in 
England?”  
13 IFS (2017), Tax design in the alcohol market 
14 London Economics (2012), “Differential price responsiveness among drinker types”  
15 Angus C, Holmes J, Pryce R, Meier P and Brennan A (2016)., ‘Alcohol and cancer trends: Intervention 
Studies University of Sheffield and Cancer Research UK’   
16 https://www.who.int/substance_abuse/safer/r/en/ 
17 Makela P and Osterberg E (2009)., ‘Weakening of one more alcohol control pillar: a review of the effects 
of the alcohol tax cuts in Finland in 2004’  
18 https://iea.org.uk/publications/of-course-sin-taxes-are-regressive/  
19 IFS Briefing Note BN124, “Alcohol Pricing and Taxation Policies”  
20 https://www.ifs.org.uk/uploads/gb/gb2016/gb2016ch9.pdf  
                                                     
SOCIAL MARKET FOUNDATION 
71 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                  
21 https://www.thelancet.com/journals/lancet/article/PIIS0140-6736(18)31310-2/fulltext  
22 https://medium.com/wintoncentre/the-risks-of-alcohol-again-2ae8cb006a4a  
23 https://www.thelancet.com/journals/lancet/article/PIIS0140-6736(18)30134-X/fulltext 
24 Department of Health (2016), “Alcohol Guidelines Review – Report from the Guidelines 
development group to the UK Chief Medical Officers”  
25 Department of Health (2016), “Alcohol Guidelines Review – Report from the Guidelines 







29 https://www.m-c-a.org.uk/documents/2016_m_bellis  
30 Rehm et al (2017), “The relationship between different dimensions of alcohol use and the 
burden of disease – an update”  
31 Bartley (2017), “Health inequality: an introduction to concepts, theories and methods. 2nd 
edn”, Polity, Cambridge 
32 http://www.ias.org.uk/What-we-do/Alcohol-Alert/June-2018.aspx#ALCOHOL-SNAPSHOT-
How-heavy-drinking-varies-by-income  
33 https://alcoholchange.org.uk/alcohol-facts/fact-sheets/alcohol-statistics  
34 Public Health England (2019), “The range and magnitude of alcohol’s harm to others: a report 
delivered to the Five Nations Health Improvement Network”  
35 Public Health England (2016), “The Public Health Burden of Alcohol and the Effectiveness and 
Cost-Effectiveness of Alcohol Control Policies – an evidence review” 
36 Rehm J, Mathers C, Popova S, Thavorncharoensap M, Teerawattananon Y, Patra J. Global 
burden of disease and injury and economic cost attributable to alcohol use and alcohol-use 
disorders. The Lancet. 2009 Jun;373(9682):2223–33 
37 WSTA Market Overview (2017) 
38 Oxford Economics (2011), “Local impact of the beer and pub sector”  
39 https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/business-42080891  
40 https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/business-42595870  
POUR DECISIONS? THE CASE FOR REFORMING ALCOHOL DUTY 
72 
 







43 MacDonald, Z. & Shields, M.A. (2004), Does problem drinking affect employment? Evidence 
from England, Health Economics13:2, pp139-55.  
44 Henkel, D. (2011), Unemployment and substance use: a review of the literature (1990-2010), 





47 https://www.gov.uk/government/organisations/office-of-tax-simplification  




51 IFS Briefing Note BN182  
52 Joseph Rowntree Foundation (2017), “How poverty affects people's decision-making 
processes” 
